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The New York Times

NATO Duel Centers on Georgia and Ukraine 

By STEVEN ERLANGER 

1 December 2008

Late Edition - Final

8

PARIS -- NATO foreign ministers will gather this week in Brussels with the United States and Germany quarreling over just how much distance to keep from Georgia and Ukraine.

The debate is ostensibly over the mechanisms through which Georgia and Ukraine will, at some point, become members of the alliance. But the real debate is over relations with Russia, especially after its brief war with Georgia in August. And those ties with Moscow are deeply wrapped up in domestic politics, both in Germany and the United States.

The Bush administration, which has maintained close ties with Georgia and with pro-Western politicians in Ukraine, wants to give no concessions to what it sees as a newly aggressive Russia. Rather, it wants NATO to send a clear message that Moscow cannot intimidate the alliance and that it does not get to veto NATO membership.

So, at her last NATO ministerial meeting, the main task for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will be to give substance to a vague promise by NATO last April that Georgia and Ukraine will someday become members. An administration that began with fundamental goals -- transforming the Middle East, spreading democracy, wiping out Al Qaeda -- it is ending with the most incremental aims.

After this week, the next NATO summit meeting will be held in April, when the organization marks its 60th anniversary and when France is scheduled to reintegrate fully into the military wing of the alliance. But by then, American relations with NATO will be the responsibility of President-elect Barack Obama and his intended secretary of state, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton.

In a possible indication of her views on NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, Mrs. Clinton, in conjunction with Senator John McCain of Arizona, nominated Presidents Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and Viktor A. Yushchenko of Ukraine in January 2005 for the Nobel Peace Prize for their roles ''in leading freedom movements'' and their ''extraordinary commitment to peace.''

Not all NATO members are so enthusiastic.

Germany, according to German and American diplomats, wants to send an accommodating message to Moscow, both by slowing down NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine and by welcoming a call by President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia for talks on a new ''security architecture'' for Europe.

For now, the German government insists that Georgia and Ukraine go through a lengthy set of steps known as a membership action plan, or MAP, before NATO enlargement is considered.

At last April's NATO summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, Germany and France blocked a last-minute push by Mr. Bush and some newer NATO members -- those with experience under Soviet rule -- to give Georgia and Ukraine immediate membership action plans. Germany and France argued that Ukraine was politically divided and that neither it nor Georgia was ready.

They also argued that a membership action plan for Ukraine would outrage Russia, which regards Ukraine as a crucial part of its mental and physical landscape, and that a plan for Georgia could destabilize the Caucasus.

Mr. Bush fought hard but lost, after reportedly annoying Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, who thought she had received a promise from him not to press for membership plans.

France and Germany compromised by agreeing that Ukraine and Georgia could become members, but they did not say when. They agreed with Washington that a MAP would be reconsidered at the meeting taking place this week.

But that was before the fighting in Georgia in August, when Russia ended up taking over the enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- within the sovereign borders of Georgia -- and then recognizing their independence. In doing so, Russia cited Washington's recognition of independence for Kosovo, wrested from Serbia militarily without a United Nations resolution.

Realizing that many Europeans are convinced that Mr. Saakashvili either started the conflict between Russia and Georgia or fell rashly into a Russian trap, American diplomats have now hinted that having a membership action plan is not as important.

Instead, the Bush administration is arguing that NATO can work to make Ukraine and Georgia ready for membership through other means, in particular the NATO-Ukraine Commission, established 11 years ago, and the NATO-Georgia Commission, which was created after the August war.

Daniel Fried, the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs, said in Washington last week that ''MAP was never an end in itself'' and that it ''is not the only way to get there.'' He emphasized that such plans were created only after the first former Soviet bloc nations joined in 1999.

France seems content with the American formulation, which raises no new flags with Moscow and does little to hasten membership for Georgia and Ukraine.

But Germany was angered, seeing the American position as ''MAP without MAP,'' or the substance without the label, according to one German official who spoke on the condition of anonymity in accordance with diplomatic practice. Germany insists that MAP remain a condition of NATO membership and has accused Washington of making an ''end run'' around the Bucharest compromise.

A senior American official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that everyone now accepts it will take ''years and years'' before Georgia and Ukraine are ready; even then, every NATO country must ratify enlargement.

''I don't really understand what the Germans want,'' he said. The American official added: ''They're clinging to MAP, but they refuse to use it. They will use it only when a country is already ready to become a NATO member, so why insist on it? They say they want to preserve it as a final hurdle. We say, 'Let's get out of this hamster ring, since everyone really is in agreement, and get on with it.' ''


Christian Science Monitor


Ukraine's stalled revolution


The global economic crisis could actually help Kiev's bogged-down government.

By The Monitor's Editorial Board

from the November 28, 2008 edition

 

The democratic "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine four years ago has turned rusty. The government is seized up over political infighting. The leader who inspired brightly dressed supporters in 2004 now has an approval rating of 5.4 percent as president. But a new development – economic crisis – may actually help unstick this large strategic country.

With reforms not made and promises not kept, the vast majority of Ukrainians say their country is headed in the wrong direction. An economic emergency can focus thinking and perhaps turn squabbling politicians into responsible adults who put Ukraine's potential ahead of their own.

And what potential Ukraine has. The size of France, this pivotal former Soviet republic could act as a stabilizing force in a new East-West divide – if it weren't so politically and culturally divided itself.

Blessed with a quarter of the earth's most fertile soil, Ukraine could hum as an agricultural powerhouse – if it worked out land rights. As a large market of 46 million people on the Black Sea, it could attract more foreign investment and trade – if rule of law ever took hold.

In part, Ukraine's leaders have had the luxury of putting personal politics first because a growing economy kept the pressure off. Not anymore. Lower global demand for steel (Ukraine's top export) pushed prices down and this fall caused a stunning 20 percent drop in production in just one month. The squeeze will tighten as Russia raises prices for its gas exports to Ukraine.

Like economies around the world, Ukraine enjoyed easy credit, turning Kiev into a glitzy metropolis where the living costs top that of any capital in Western Europe. But with credit dried up, the government has had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $16.5 billion megabailout.

A funny thing happened on the way to the bailout. President Viktor Yushchenko called off a snap parliamentary election because the financial crisis took precedence (besides, the oligarchs who fund campaigns have lost a fortune). And the parliament got busy and passed banking reform for the IMF rescue. This shows country can come first, but Ukraine is too weak to travel the road to democracy alone.

The European Union must keep encouraging reforms, as it is by negotiating an "association agreement" with Kiev, which wants full membership. Foreign investors should look to the long term, and not run. And the idea of a formal path to eventual membership for Ukraine in NATO (known as "MAP") should be dropped. It provokes Moscow, and NATO itself is divided over this.

So are Ukrainians, a quarter of whom speak Russian and feel kinship with Russia. For decades, NATO was a four-letter word described in crossword puzzles as an "aggressive military bloc." Only 15 percent of Ukrainians see NATO as a protection. Better simply to advance NATO-Ukrainian military cooperation, as the US proposed this week, and leave the door open for membership without getting entangled in official designations.

It's been 17 years since the Soviet Union broke up and Ukraine became an independent country – but only four years since it committed itself to the democratic path. It's barely walking, and needs all the support it can get.

 

The Washington Times 

Yushchenko mars Orange anniversary, 

26 November 2008 

 

Taras Kuzio SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

 

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

 

Nov. 22 was the fourth anniversary of the Orange Revolution and, in the West and in Ukraine, fatigue is growing with Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine's president and erstwhile Orange Revolution hero.

 

On Ukraine's domestic front, Ukrainians blame Mr. Yushchenko for four years of political instability that have led to repeated crises and the likelihood that five governments and three elections will come and go before the end of his first term in office. Internationally, Mr. Yushchenko's visit to Washington two months ago proved to be a diplomatic failure. Gone were the accolades that accompanied his triumphant visit to Washington four years earlier, when he was given the rare honor of speaking to both houses of Congress.

 

On the fourth anniversary of the revolution that brought Mr. Yushchenko to power, a newly released survey by the International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES) found increasing pessimism among Ukrainians regarding the direction in which their country is headed. Mr. Yushchenko's job-approval rating stands at 3 percent. Eighty-two percent of Ukrainians express no confidence in him, and three-quarters think he should not stand for a second term.

 

This deep unpopularity and lack of trust raises the question: How can Mr.

Yushchenko hope to successfully lead Ukraine out of the global financial crisis?

 

Rather than address the crisis, Mr. Yushchenko is opting for self-preservation by dissolving parliament for a third time and calling for pre-term elections. It is widely thought, both at home and abroad, that his objective is once again to stop Yulia Tymoshenko's reign as prime minister.

Mr. Yushchenko has punctuated this fact by derailing his own party's negotiations to form a renewed, more stable Orange Coalition with Mrs.

Tymoshenko's bloc.

 

The president's actions fail to recognize Ukraine's need for a stable government during this time of global financial crisis. Ukraine is currently held in a captive state, crippled by the ongoing crisis. Now more than ever, the country's national interests must take precedence over Mr. Yushchenko's bitter disdain for Mrs. Tymoshenko.

 

Brussels and Washington are aghast at the prospect of a president who is so oblivious to the consequences of his actions, contemplating destabilizing elections and fostering domestic political chaos while his country is facing the monumental challenge of a global crisis.

 

The vast majority of the the president's domestic supporters also have deserted him; indeed, many have joined Mrs. Tymoshenko. Most of the president's longtime business and political allies have questioned his strategy, only to find themselves ostracized. Only a week ago, the president betrayed one of Ukraine's best economists, parliamentary Speaker Arseniy Yatseniuk. In supporting the removal of the popular speaker, the president has chosen to further incapacitate parliament at a time when it is most needed to assist in dealing with the global crisis.

 

In continuing to foster political instability and to hamstring parliament, Mr. Yushchenko is playing with fire. Ukraine just negotiated a $16.5 billion loan with the International Monetary Fund in an effort stave off the collapse of its banking sector. The IMF has since insisted on parliament adopting anti-crisis measures that require political and governmental stability. However, the perpetual political crisis has hindered the implementation of much-needed structural reforms, blocked the launch of the current government's radical privatization plan and reduced the government's ability to lower inflation.

 

On the foreign front, plans for NATO expansion to Ukraine also have been derailed by domestic political instability. There has never been a Ukrainian government in office long enough to launch a national campaign to build a consensus around NATO membership. Support for NATO membership needs to be increased and currently oscillates between one-quarter and one-third of the Ukrainian people. The day he disbanded parliament, Mr. Yushchenko made the chances of achieving a NATO Membership Action Plan at next month's NATO review conference obsolete.

 

Mr. Yushchenko was warned by Western ambassadors to choose between undermining the Tymoshenko government and moving his country toward NATO. He inexplicably chose the former. Stephen Larrabee, who holds the corporate chair in European security at the Rand Corp., blamed Mr. Yushchenko "for undermining Ukraine's integration into the West."

 

With the possibility of Mr. Yushchenko's re-election in just a year's time, the new U.S. administration needs to follow Europe in refocusing its vision of Mrs. Tymoshenko as the only Orange leader capable of defeating the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, beholden to corrupt, oligarchic barons. A Tymoshenko presidency could provide Ukraine with a second chance of relaunching the reforms demanded by millions of Ukrainians four years ago, which would bring Ukraine out of the Russian bear's embrace and into the West.

 

Mr. Yushchenko had his chance, and he has failed.

 

€ Taras Kuzio is editor of the bimonthly Ukraine Analyst and an adjunct professor in the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa. 

 

Eurasia Daily Monitor

November 26, 2008

 

Medvedev’s Refusal To Attend Famine Commemorations Worsens Already Poor Relations


Ukraine’s relations with Russia have deteriorated to their lowest level in two decades, with Zerkalo Nedeli (November 22) stating that the Russian authorities and society have never been as negatively disposed toward Ukraine as now, even during the Orange Revolution. The deterioration has taken place not only in the traditional areas of energy (with another gas war looming), the Black Sea Fleet, NATO membership, and the status of the Russian language, but also in attitudes toward the past.

The latest deterioration in relations came during the week in which Ukraine held official commemorations for the 75th anniversary of the artificial famine in 1933. Russian President Vladimir Medvedev refused to attend the commemoration, which was attended by 44 delegations, including four EU leaders.

Medvedev’s refusal was condemned by President Viktor Yushchenko and the Ukrainian intelligentsia in a protest statement (www.korrespondent.com.ua, November 20). Ukraine’s Ambassador to Russia and Foreign Minister of the Party of Regions Kostyantyn Hryshchenko expressed widespread disappointment over Russia’s refusal to denounce even the Stalinist crimes and famine that took place on Russia’s own territory. “Until this topic was raised by Ukraine, nobody in Russia or other post-Soviet republics raised it,” Hryshchenko said (www.pravda.com.ua, November 19).

On October 26 Russia’s RTR television network broadcast a report that distorted the famine and Yushchenko’s publicizing of it. The program alleged that the famine issue was dreamed up in the 1980s by Cold war Warriors, such as U.S. President Ronald Reagan, and implemented by their supporters, such as Katia Chumachenko (now the Ukrainian First Lady). The purpose, RTR alleged, was to sow enmity between Ukrainians and Russians. Ukraine’s campaign to call attention to the famine has “become deeply politicized” and the genocide concept “is based on narrow nationalism,” Russian political technologist Sergei Markov claimed. The SBU was giving a falsified interpretation and making a subjective analysis of real documents,” Markov said (www.pravda.com.ua, November 17, 22).

Ukrainian authorities have faced two difficulties in raising the issue of the famine.

First, although 13 countries—including six post-communist states, Canada, and Australia—have supported Yushchenko’s call for the famine to be defined as “genocide,” most countries still remain reluctant to use this definition. The 17th session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament voted in July and October, respectively, to recognize the Ukrainian famine; but both refrained from describing it as “genocide.”

The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill on September 23 to commemorate the famine but used the word “genocide” carefully, citing the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, formed on December 13, 1985. The U.S. resolution pointed to the October 13, 2006, Public Law 109-340 that authorized Ukraine, “to establish a memorial on Federal land in the District of Columbia to honor the victims of the Ukrainian famine-genocide of 1932-1933.”

Russian officials gloated over the lack of support from the UN General Assembly in September, when Yushchenko outlined Ukraine’s case for the body to acknowledge the famine as genocide. Yushchenko described the famine as a genocide accompanied by the “total elimination of the national elite, public leadership, and priesthood” (www.president.gov.ua, September 23).

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that the UN was “not the venue for pushing through biased and distorted views of historical events” (www.mid.ru, September 24). Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN Vitaliy Churkin said that the October 23 statement on the famine by Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) did not contain a grain of truth. It was a “unique diplomatic document” that “contradicts the real state of affairs.”

Ukraine’s MFA had condemned Russia’s UN delegation for using “pressure and blackmail” to stop the famine from being discussed at the UN (www.pravda.com.ua, October 29). Ukraine’s (MFA) had earlier condemned Russia’s unwillingness to support Ukraine’s condemnation of the famine, pointing to November 2003 when Russia had supported a UN resolution on the “70th anniversary of the Ukrainian tragedy” and two years later when Russia backed a UNESCO resolution “commemorating victims of the great famine [Holodomor] in Ukraine in 1932 and 1933” (www.mfa.gov.ua, September 29).

Second, the number of victims continues to be debated. Yushchenko always uses the figure of 10 million deaths, making it “one of the greatest humanitarian catastrophes in the world” (www.pravda.com.ua, November 20). Yushchenko included the famine with Russification and deportations to Siberia as part of a package of repressions aimed at destroying “our culture, our identity, and our strivings to be an independent country” (www.pravda.com.ua, November 20).

Ukrainian and Western academic studies give lower estimates of 2.6 to 5.2 million deaths with most citing between 3 and 3.5 million. Added to this should be the one million Ukrainians who died in the Kuban region of the northern Caucasus, which destroyed Ukrainian identity in the area.

The “10 million” figure is, in fact, the demographic loss rather than the death toll and ignores the calculations of Ukraine’s foremost scholar in the field, Stanislav Kulchytsky, who arrived at an estimate of 3,238,000 deaths (see John Paul Himka in The Kyiv Post, May 15). The overwhelming majority of the famine victims were Ukrainians (despite Chernomyrdin’s protestations), as the famine devastated the countryside. Russians and other non-Ukrainian ethnic groups populated the urban centers.

The famine has become another of the many issues contributing to poor Ukrainian-Russian relations. On May 15, 2003, the Ukrainian Parliament issued a strong condemnation of the famine as being directed against Ukrainians and called for international recognition of the Holodomor. Although the issue has been raised by all three Ukrainian presidents, Yushchenko alone has been accused by the Russians of nationalism for raising the issue of the famine. The fact that Russia is fiercely antagonistic to the famine issue today, in contrast to five years ago, says more about the speed of Stalin’s rehabilitation in Russia than it does about Ukraine. Yushchenko’s call to Medvedev jointly to “condemn Stalinist crimes and the totalitarian Soviet Union” will never happen while Putinism continues to rejuvenate Stalinism.


—Taras Kuzio


Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Sevastopol Refuses To Help Finance First Ukrainian-Language School

November 21, 2008 

 

KYIV -- The Sevastopol City Council has voted against partially financing the construction of the first Ukrainian-language school in this Black Sea port, RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service reports.

Of the more than 80 schools in Sevastopol -- which houses both the Ukrainian and the Russian Black Sea fleets -- only three schools are bilingual, where some classes are taught in Ukrainian but the majority in Russian.

There is no school in the city in which classes are only in Ukrainian.

The Ukrainian government supports the establishment of the Ukrainian-language school and has authorized 5 million hryvni (about $1 million) for its construction.

By law, the local government must contribute 20 percent of the costs, or 500,000 hryvni.

The Sevastopol City Council will vote on the issue again in December.

 

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