[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: WP editorial; EDM (2)

[Deychak, Orest]

The Washington Post

Editorial

Mr. Putin's Bluff; The Russian leader claims to be expecting major concessions from the Obama administration. 

7 December 2008

FINAL

B06

VLADIMIR PUTIN'S unsubtle campaign to intimidate President-elect Barack Obama continues apace. In a broadcast appearance Thursday, the Russian prime minister claimed to have detected some "positive signals" from the incoming administration. For example, "we hear from people close to the president-elect" that "there should be no rush" toward NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, because "one should not spoil relations with Russia." Also, "we already hear that [Obama] should rethink the expediency of deploying" missile defense systems.

In other words, what Mr. Putin claims to understand is that the new U.S. government will surrender on the two pressure points Moscow has been using in its attempt to reestablish itself as an imperial power in Europe and a counterweight to the United States. He suggests that Mr. Obama will give up the U.S. policy of supporting eventual NATO membership for the two countries on Russia's borders that are seeking to establish themselves as liberal democracies and abandon the Bush administration's compacts with the Polish and Czech governments to install missile interceptors and a radar system aimed at Iran.

We don't believe that Mr. Obama has any intention of caving in to such bluster. But Mr. Putin's rhetoric underlines two early and difficult issues the administration will have to manage, not only with Russia but with European allies who will try to tug the new president in different directions.

At its final NATO ministerial meeting last week, the Bush administration barely managed to finesse the issue of Georgia and Ukraine. Though NATO resolved at a summit this year that the two countries will eventually become members, Germany and Italy now lead a group of countries that, following Russia's invasion of Georgia in August, want to stop any steps toward that goal. Former Warsaw Pact countries such as Poland and Lithuania, by contrast, argue that only firm NATO support for Ukraine and Georgia -- and a more tangible presence in their own countries -- will deter further Russian aggression.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice finally agreed to a compromise in which Georgia and Ukraine will begin programs to prepare for NATO but will not, for now, be awarded the "membership action plan" that previous candidates have used. NATO also renewed its endorsement of a European-based missile defense. That essentially leaves both initiatives in a gray zone; the Obama administration will have to decide whether to use the ambiguous NATO mandate to provide vigorous support for Ukraine and Georgia, and whether to press ahead with the missile defense deals struck by the Bush administration.

Legitimate questions exist about whether the outgoing administration has unreasonably rushed the missile system and about the reliability of the current governments of Georgia and Ukraine. But Mr. Putin's words are a reminder of another reality: Any retreat by the new administration on these issues will be taken by the Kremlin as a victory for its neo-imperialist project and as a sign of Mr. Obama's weakness. The "signals" Mr. Putin receives from the new president need not be provocative or antagonistic, but when it comes to defending the independence of Russia's democratic neighbors, Mr. Obama's message must be firm.

http://www.washingtonpost.com

 

Eurasia Daily Monitor

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/

 

December 5, 2008


Ukraine Beefs Up Its Military Defenses with an Eye on Russia


Since the Russian invasion of Georgia in August, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has stressed the need to review defense priorities, with reference to the budgetary allocations to the military (The Times, August 23). The president warned that he would refuse to sign the state budget for 2009 unless it increased the military budget for 2008.

Yushchenko's demand for higher outlays comes at a bad time, as Ukraine's 2009 budget will be severely constrained by parliament's anti-crisis package adopted in October as a precondition for a $16.4 billion IMF standby loan. The president is unwarranted in blaming the Yulia Tymoshenko government for the state of the military, inasmuch as it was starved of funds by all the previous 13 governments.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov announced plans to increase Ukraine's military presence in the Crimea and to deploy new units on Ukraine's border with Russia. Asked if he feared that the Crimea would become a "second South Ossetia," Yekhanurov replied that "Military provocation will not take place. There are certain tendencies there, but we have sufficient forces to localize a threat' (Tyzhden, November 7-13). Unlike South Ossetia, the Crimea has never been a frozen conflict zone outside of Ukraine's central control.

Yekhanurov pointed out that the Crimea was different from South Ossetia because Ukraine had well equipped security forces based on the peninsula that included marines, the best trained units in the armed forces, as well as air force and anti-aircraft missile complexes (AMC). In the aftermath of the invasion of Georgia, these units would be strengthened and prioritized, Yekhanurov said.

The Pivdenmash company (Yuzhmash) in Dnipropetrovsk, one of the largest military industrial complexes in the former USSR, is developing a new AMC, the advantage of which is that it can be used to provide support to both aviation troops and to infantry and naval forces. The new AMC, expected to enter production in 2010, will be used in ground to air, ground to ground, and ship to ship anti-aircraft units and is undergoing tests at Ukraine's only test site near Feodosiya, Crimea.

Yekhanurov announced plans to deploy new units to the Ukraine's long land border with Russia. In the Soviet period, eastern Ukraine had no military district; Ukraine's two military districts were western and southern. A Northern Operational Command (NOC), headquartered in Chernihiv on the Russian border, was created in the mid 1990s to cover Ukraine's northern and eastern regions bordering Russia.

The 8th Army Corps forms the basis of NOC, which includes one airmobile, one artillery, and three mechanized brigades as well as the Army Aviation Regiment. The Army Aviation (air defense) Regiment was deployed in eastern Ukraine last year and provides a defense umbrella over economically important Donbas. Next year further Ukrainian military units will be deployed on Ukraine's land border with Russia (Delo, November 26).

Following the collapse of the USSR, the Crimea quickly came under Ukrainian central control, the exception being the Black Sea Fleet, which remained contested until the May 1997 agreement with Russia. The Southern Operational Command (SOC), headquartered in Odessa, is based on the former Soviet Southern Military District, excluding Moldova.

Ukraine has large armed forces structures in the Crimea, which falls under the SOC, as the region was heavily militarized in the USSR. The 6th Army Corps is central to the SOC, which includes one airborne, one airmobile, one armored, one artillery, and three mechanized brigades (www.sentinel.janes.com).

In addition, Ukraine has other security forces in the Crimea: naval (seamen, marines, and special forces), border troops, and Interior Ministry (MVS) Special Forces. The Crimea Tactical Group in Belbek is based around the 204th Fighter Aviation Brigade operating MiG-29s for air defense and attack.

Elite National Guard units were stationed in the Crimea from 1991 to 1999. After President Leonid Kuchma abolished the guard and transferred these units to the MVS in 2000 they were the best trained MVS Special Forces.

During the Orange Revolution, at a time when the majority of the MVS had defected to Yushchenko, the Crimean MVS Special Forces remained loyal to the end to Kuchma. Dispatched to Kyiv to guard the presidential administration, Crimean MVS Special Forces, such as BARS, were mistakenly reported as "Russian spetsnaz."

Russia's reaction to Ukraine's proposed re-deployment was entirely negative, describing it as a "provocation." Nikolai Tulayev, a member of the State Duma's Committee on Defense and Security, ridiculed the idea that Ukraine's armed forces would become a threat to Russia. "From the military point of view, the Ukrainian armed forces do not constitute a threat to anybody," Tulayev scoffed (UNIAN, November 29).

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin rejected the idea of a Russian threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity (Germany's ARD television channel, August 30). Following Russia's invasion of Georgia, no Ukrainian president or government could ignore continued provocations in the Crimea by Russian nationalists, the distribution of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens, and threats not to remove the Black Sea Fleet in 2017. Two Russian Crimean leaders were arrested last week and charged with threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Putin told the April NATO summit that Ukraine was an artificial state that could disintegrate if the country joined NATO. These views are commonplace across Russia's political spectrum, from the Communists, through Unified Russia's "pragmatists," to the pro-Putin nationalist camp. Russia's NATO representative Dimitri Rogozin warned the BBC on December 1 that Ukraine would disintegrate if it joined NATO.

Regime loyalist and nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the deputy chairman of the State Duma and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, said that two-thirds of Ukraine was in reality "Russian territory." If Ukraine wanted to remain independent, Zhirinovsky advised, it could only remain so in a third of the territory that it currently occupied, with the other two thirds reverting to Russia (www.pravda.com.ua, December 1). These views are echoed by Moscow Mayor and senior Unified Russia member Yury Luzhkov, who raised territorial demands on Sevastopol during his visit to the Crimean peninsula in May.

Ukraine's deployment of additional units to the Crimea and its land border with Russia reflects Ukraine's perceived security threats following Russia's invasion of Georgia. In Ukraine's eyes the threat is real, albeit unrecognized by Brussels.

-Taras Kuzio

 

Eurasia Daily Monitor

December 5, 2008

 

NATO ANPs Instead of MAPs for Ukraine and Georgia


NATO has pushed aside the Membership Action Plans (MAPs) as mechanisms for Ukraine's and Georgia's eventual accession to the alliance. On December 3 in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs decided to develop Annual National Programs (ANPs) for Ukraine and Georgia, instead of MAPs. The Allies have yet to announce how long it will take to develop the first ANP and when it will go into effect.

The alliance split over the Ukrainian and Georgian MAP applications earlier this year. The United States, Canada, Britain (however unfocused on the issue), and almost all the countries that joined NATO in recent years were supportive. Germany led a group of West European countries in opposition. The alliance's Bucharest Summit on April 2 reached a hard-fought compromise: It declared unambiguously that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO (a political commitment unprecedented in NATO's history) but did not identify a mechanism or other path toward membership (a failure unprecedented in NATO's enlargement process from the 1990s to date) (see EDM, March 11, 13, 30, 21, and April 4, 7, 10, 11).

The NAC meeting in Brussels on December 3 reaffirmed the political decision made in Bucharest on Ukraine and Georgia, now adding an implementation mechanism: the ANPs, presented as a "performance-based process," that is, presumably free from political distortion. The ANPs will provide further assistance to Ukraine and Georgia in implementing necessary reforms "as they progress toward NATO membership."

NATO and the two countries will use the NATO-Ukraine Commission (in existence since 1997) and the NATO-Georgia Commission (created immediately after the Russian invasion last August), respectively, as "central" instruments in drafting and implementing those reforms. "NATO will maximize its advice, assistance, and support" to that end and will review progress on an annual basis (Meeting of the North Atlantic Council communiqué, December 3).

The NATO-Ukraine Commission held a meeting at the foreign ministers level on the same day in Brussels. In that meeting the Allies reaffirmed their "conviction that Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity were key factors for ensuring stability in Europe" (the only strategic consideration that entered into NATO's discourse during this entire event). The meeting welcomed "progress achieved" through the current NATO-Ukraine mechanism, known as Annual Target Plans within a multi-year Action Plan (no "M") for security sector reforms, as well as the NATO-Ukraine Intensified Dialogue at the political level. Ukraine, moreover, has enjoyed a special status since 1997 under the NATO-Ukraine Charter for Distinctive Partnership. The commission did not clarify how the new Annual National Programs would upgrade the existing framework. Pending such decisions, the Allies decided at this meeting to reinforce the NATO Information and Documentation Center and the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv.

This immediate decision reflects continuing concern over NATO's low popularity rating in Ukraine and the Orange authorities' failure to educate the public about the alliance, despite multiple promises to do so. The meeting also urged the "political leaders of Ukraine to settle their differences in a way that ensures domestic stability." Attending the meeting, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Ohryzko spoke of the need for more adequate funding of reforms in the military and security sector and for raising public awareness of NATO issues.

On the level of cooperation in the field, however, NATO-Ukraine relations remain strong. Ukraine participates in NATO missions and operations in Kosovo, the ISAF (International Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, and the naval Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean. It recently acceded to NATO's Air Situation Data Exchange Program, decided to contribute to the British-French Helicopter Initiative within NATO, offered to participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF) currently being developed, and has recently offered to provide overland transit for equipment and supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan (Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission communiqué, December 3).

Also on December 3 in Brussels, the NATO-Georgia Commission held its first meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs. The commission had already met in September at the defense-minister level to review the military situation in the immediate aftermath of Russia's invasion of Georgia. During the Brussels meeting the NAC cited its June 2008 positive assessment of Georgia's IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) performance and the NAC's successful visit to Georgia in September. It expressed appreciation for Georgia's contributions to NATO-led operations and decided to reinforce the NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi.

Publicly at least, the meeting abounded in advice to Georgia to continue upgrading its electoral processes, the professionalism and independence of judges, media freedom, transparency in government, and the rule of law. "Georgia's continuing implementation of reform initiatives will be watched closely by the alliance." While partly warranted and often useful, such admonitions also reflect two distorting political factors. The first is a sense of unfulfilled expectations after the U.S. rhetoric about "Georgia the beacon of democracy" had raised the bar for Georgia unrealistically high. The second distorting factor is West European political correctness in invoking democracy issues to block Georgia's path to NATO, despite Georgia's major strides on those issues from 2003 to date.

The Brussels meeting focused more effectively on Georgia's military and security issues. It recommended a lessons-learned process after the recent armed conflict, incorporating those lessons into Georgia's planned comprehensive review of security documents, as well as improving personnel management within the military, transparency of the defense budget, and interoperability of Georgian forces with those of the NATO allies. Attending the meeting, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Eka Tkeshelashvili expressed gratitude for NATO's commitment to assist Georgian efforts to achieve NATO standards (Meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission communiqué, December 3).

-Vladimir Socor

 

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/ms-tnef
Size: 18311 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://clevelanduzo.org/pipermail/uzonews_clevelanduzo.org/attachments/20081208/f0cb3811/attachment.bin>