[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: Independence Day VOA; WoE; FT

[Deychak, Orest]

Happy Ukrainian Independence Day!

 

VOA TV’s Chas-Time Independence Day program (in Ukrainian):  1. comments on Ukraine’s Independence Day from Steve Pifer, Nadia Diuk, Orest Deychakiwsky; 2.  a look back at the 1993 opening of the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington; 3.  interview with Ukraine’s Ambassador to the U.S. Oleh Shamshur:  

http://www.voanews.com/ukrainian/chas_time.cfm

 

VOA transcripts of interviews with Nadia Diuk, Orest Deychakiwsky (parts 1 and 2)  on the occasion of Ukrainian Independence Day (in English)

http://www.voanews.com/ukrainian/ <http://www.voanews.com/ukrainian/> 

 

Україна – 18 років незалежності. Думки експертів: Надія Дюк  

Мирослава Ґонґадзе 
Вашингтон
23/08/2009

	

З нагоди 18-ої річниці незалежності України своїми думками поділилася з Голосом Америки Надія Дюк – директор європейських та євразійських програм Національного фонду демократії – впливової неурядової організації, яку фінансує Конгрес США.

Дивіться інтерв’ю мовою оригіналу.

MG:  
Joining us today at the Voice of America – Nadia Diuk, senior director for Europe and Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy. Thank you, Nadia, for coming today to our studio. 

Ukraine is celebrating eighteen years of its independence. Do you think there is much to celebrate?

ND:
Oh, I think there is a lot to celebrate. I think that despite all the current political difficulties that Ukraine is going through the people need to remember that eighteen years ago Ukraine was not a name that slipped easily off the tongue of anyone who was looking at the world or looking at geopolitics in any way. And the fact that Ukraine has actually established an independent country with all of the institutions of an independent state I think is just phenomenal. As well, I think you have to pay attention to the fact that if Ukraine had not attained its independence I think the three Baltic states would have had much more difficulty in keeping hold of their independence. And I think other states such as Belorus and Moldova would not have had a chance and the three Caucasus countries as well would by no means have had independence.

MG:
So we would have a different Europe today?

ND:
We would have a different Europe, indeed.

MG:
What was the moment in the history of Ukraine’s independence, when the development of the country could have gone in a different direction?

ND:
It’s interesting to speculate the “what ifs” of history. However I do think there are some that could be highlighted when there were some disappointments. During the nineteen nineties, I think, there was a very vibrant and vigorous community of politicians and civil society organizations emerging in Ukraine. And I think around about the time of nineteen ninety-eight, nineteen ninety-nine, there was a pullback. And I think at the time not enough people were aware enough quickly enough that this was going to lead to the very difficult period of 2000-2004 where there was really a strong pullback on media freedoms, on freedoms of all kind as well. President Kuchma didn’t do himself any favors in terms of international relations with various items that were going on at that time. But then that did lead to the Orange Revolution. And I think the fact of the Orange Revolution, the way that it occurred, the way that it engaged the entire society, the way that it actually helped in a sense to unify East and West Ukraine, I think that has been a very positive thing.

MG:
Can we say that the Ukrainian people actually defended their independence in that period of time?

ND:
I believe, yes, they were… independence in a very broad sense. I think specifically those four years between 2000 – 2004. I mean anyone who was visiting Ukraine at that time really felt, talking to the man on the street, not only the politicians, that there was a narrowing of political space, of social space, that somehow the gains that had been promised after independence were being pulled back. And I think this was a reaction, a very sort of visceral and almost existential reaction to this pulling back. And also the desire to keep the momentum moving forward in a democratic direction, in a pro-West direction, for a great part of the population.  

MG:
To what extent do you think Ukraine still remain terra incognita for the world?

ND:
Well, compared with how it was twenty years ago, when… You know, this was a nation of 52 million people, well, inhabitants. And I remember very distinctly the quote from Milan Kundera, the famous Czech author, who said, for decades now Ukraine, the world’s largest nation without a state, has been has been disappearing off the face of the Earth and no one has been paying any attention. Well, from that point to what we have now I think we’rv actually come a very long way. Now you never, very rarely get people saying, “Oh, Ukraine, where is that? It’s in Russia somewhere.” Maybe I’m going back very far now, to pre-independence days. But. I think, there is no mixing up Ukraine and Russia much anymore. Ukraine has its own identity, which, I believe, is evolving. It still has quite a way to go before it’s sort of fixed in people’s minds. But it’s seen in popular culture as well. I think sportsmen, pop stars, have done a lot to actually cement that image of Ukraine being a separate nation, a separate state with its own identity.

MG:
And the last question – I would like you to foresee the future of Ukraine, let’s say for the next ten years.

ND:
Next ten years…. My crystal ball, what do I see? Again, I think there is a generational factor at play. Even the generation of most of the candidates for president right now are still of the Soviet generation. They are people who not only went to school in Soviet times, but actually the first part of their career was pretty much conducted according to Soviet rules and regulations. And I think that cannot help but have some sort of impact on the way they see the world. I think that after these ten years I do already see younger politicians and civic activists, particularly in Ukraine, who view the world differently. They’ve traveled a lot more, they’ve spoken to people in the West a lot more, they see Ukraine as more a part of the world. They’re more aware of globalization. I think there will be some more difficulties over the next probably three to five years. But I think after ten years I fully expect to see Ukraine integrated much more into Europe, if not actually a candidate member or probably a member, maybe a member of Europe. Because it’s a very large country, it’s an important country. And I think, as well, the Europeans are just beginning to come to grasp with the fact that they have this large land mass, this large population, that is basically sort of waiting for to be admitted. And Europeans also need to think something, to do something constructive to make that happen.

MG:
So, the future of Ukraine is the new generation of Ukraine….

ND:
I would say so. That’s a very easy thing to say. But in a funny way, it’s true. I think you need to get rid of the last vestiges of Soviet man. The people who looked to Moscow went to the MGU [Moscow State University] for their education. And there are a lot of very smart Ukrainians in Moscow who just stayed there, because Moscow, of course, took the best and the brightest. Not to say that there aren’t very good people in Ukraine too. But I think a generation really…. You know, Moses had to lead the tribe around for forty years in the wilderness before they could create their own state. And I think there is something of that element that is going on in Ukraine now. The younger generation do have a different outlook. They have different expectations. They have a different level of energy. And I’m very hopeful that they will fulfill all of our ideals and asperations.

MG:
For Ukraine…

ND:
For Ukraine.

 

 

Україна – 18 років незалежності. Думки експерта: Ореста Дейчаківського 

Мирослава Ґонґадзе 
Вашингтон
23/08/2009

	

З нагоди 18-ої річниці незалежності України своїми думками з Голосом Америки поділився радник Гельсінської комісії при Конгресі США, Орест Дейчаківський

MG:
Joining us today at the Voice of America is Orest Deychakiwsky, policy advisor at the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Commission.

Orest, thank you for coming today.

OD:
Thank you.

MG:
Ukraine is celebrating eighteen years of independence. What do you see as the major accomplishment for Ukraine over the last eighteen years?

OD:
The major accomplishment, if one looks at it from a historical perspective, is the very fact of independence. It is an unbelievably important event, not only for Ukraine itself, which struggled mightily often over the centuries and decades for that independence, but also for Europe as a whole, and Ukraine’s independence has had very important and significant implications for the region and, indeed, for the world. Ukraine has, throughout the eighteen years, it has built its state institutions, as imperfect as they are. Ukraine has freedoms, respect for rights and liberties. Again, it’s not a perfect process, it’s an evolving process, but when one compares it, for instance, to Russia or Belorus, its closest Eastern Slavic neighbors, Ukraine is a far better place in many respects.

MG: I think the world already learned that Ukraine is this big country in Europe.   As a long-time advocate for Ukraine’s independence in the United States, what do you think is the biggest disappointment of the last eighteen years?

OD:

Well, the biggest disappointment – I’d put it in several categories – I would say the biggest disappointment is the lack of rule of law. Or the inadequacy, I should say, of the rule of law, corruption, the internal political squabbles, the lack of, and this is going back into several of the last years, the lack of a delineation of powers between the prime-minster and the president, the lack of a completion of economic reforms. There’s definitely been a good start, but it’s not a completed process yet. So, Ukraine has moved along, but it’s not a consolidated democracy yet. And that’s perhaps the biggest obstacle. That’s not, admittedly, one thing, that’s several things, but all these things are related. And I think, whereas Ukraine’s independence is assured, despite Medvedev’s recent aggressive comments last week, despite Putin telling George Bush last year that Ukraine is not really a state, despite Russian actions towards Ukraine, which definitely have not been helpful, I’m confident that Ukraine will remain independent, because it has the power and the ability to withstand such pressure. But the question is – the quality of that independence.

MG:
If we could go back in time – was there a moment in history, in these eighteen years, when things could have gone differently?

OD:
Well, clearly, one was the Orange Revolution. And as one who himself had been an OSCE election observer and who stood on the Maydan for the first few days too and saw all the energy and the tremendous number of people and what they were calling for, there’s no question about it, that there have been a lot of missed opportunities and that all of the promises of the Orange Revolution, -- many of them, sad to say -- have not been fulfilled. Which is not the same as to say that none of them have. I’d say even with that Ukraine’s a better place than it was in many respects before the Orange Revolution. But there’s no question about it that there has been a disappointment and there’s been a lot of frustration because of that, not only here in the United States or in Europe, but first and foremost among the Ukrainian people themselves. And it’s not accidental that prominent politicians in Ukraine have low ratings.

Deychakiwsky interview, part II.

MG:
How is Ukraine viewed today on Capitol Hill? Why is Ukraine important for the United States? That’s a question a lot of Ukrainians ask.  

OD: 
Well, it’s still important because it plays a major contributing role in fostering security and stability in the region and the world. And if you have an independent, democratic, prosperous Ukraine, you’re going to have a Europe and a region that’s a lot better. But second of all – and I’ll be a little less diplomatic than some might be on this – but without Ukraine you don’t have a Russian Empire or a Soviet Union. And that clearly is in the United States’ and the world’s interest, because one just needs to look at the history of the Soviet Union, and I think it becomes very clear, you know. That doesn’t mean that Americans or people don’t think that Ukraine should have good relations with Russia, but they should be done on a basis where Russia shows respect for Ukraine, and I’m not sure that’s been happening, in fact it has not been happening, especially lately.

MG:
In the situation of Russia aggression, we hear a lot of statements, we saw the Duma pass the law to defend their soldiers -- there’s a lot of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, as we know, in the Black Sea fleet – in the situation of aggression, which we know happened with Georgia, what would the United States be able to do? How would the United States be able to support in such a situation?

OD: 
That’s an interesting question, where we really get into the nitty-gritty of policy things. You’d have diplomatic support in that worst-case scenario. It’d definitely, without a doubt, should something like that happen, harm our, U.S. relations with Russia. I think if that happened you could forget any kind of reset, or whatever. There might be economic sanctions, or what have you.  So there’s an arsenal, if you will, of tools that the U.S. could possible undertake in that kind of very negative scenario. I happen to think -- and maybe I’m going out on a limb here -- that Russia, as irrational as the statements of some of its leadership are, and I think we know what’s behind that and part of it is this continuing inability for all-too-many Russians to come to terms with an independent Ukraine. That’s, I think, at the core and the root of the problem and there are a lot of reasons for that that could take a whole another discussion. But I don’t think that Russia, even the current leadership, would really try to provoke a war, or something along the lines of what Dugin said the other day or what that resolution calls for. And especially because – with all due respect to Georgia – Ukraine isn’t Georgia. And if Russia tried anything, frankly, there would be a lot more push-back on the part of Ukraine, and I think the more-sober heads in the Kremlin completely understand that. That doesn’t mean that there won’t be attempts -- and of course they already exist – to continue to influence or even undermine Ukraine, especially governments, or presidents, like now.

MG:
To interfere in the internal affairs or the elections…

OD:
Exactly. You could already see that coming. Of course the Russians should keep in mind, and I’ve even seen some commentators from Russia say that may not be a good idea because that could end up having a counterproductive effect.

MG:
Backfire.

OD:
Backfire. Precisely. So we’ll see what happens in that realm. But I think it’s an unhealthy relationship and most of it is for the reasons I think I said, that the core of the problem being Russia’s inability to recognize and to accept, even psychologically or emotionally – even if they accept it, in a way, intellectually – that Ukraine, their brother, as they often like to refer to it, or cousins, Ukrainians, want to chart their own future and that that future might be a bit different than Russia’s future.  

MG:
It’s a good ending point for our interview. What is the future of Ukraine?

OD:
This is not original, but I remember somebody about a decade ago at one of these Washington think-tanks saying that “Ukraine is doomed to succeed.” And I believe that it is. It’s sort of muddling along. It’s done a lot of things right.  

MG:
And a lot of things wrong.

OD:
Exactly. Whenever you’re talking about Ukraine you sort of have to talk, “on the one hand, on the other hand.” Compare it with Belarus. Ukraine has an open political system. It respects human rights and all that. Yes, it’s vulnerable to Russian pressures, partly because it doesn’t quite have its act together internally and all the squabbling and what-not, the energy question, which is a major vulnerability to Russia and which is something that Ukraine really has had a deficit on in terms of confronting the energy issue. But then on the other hand, if you think about it, Belarus is even more vulnerable to Russia. If it had an open political system, like Ukraine, if it had more market reforms, like Ukraine – even though, again, in Ukraine it’s still a work in progress – if it was more, shall we say, European, if it had a more open political system, it would be less vulnerable to Russia. And we see right now how vulnerable Lukashenka is to Russia. It’s really a problem.

MG:
Of the three countries – Belarus, Russia and Ukraine – which signed the agreement to go their separate ways in ’91, who succeeded the most?

OD:
I think despite all its flaws Ukraine has succeeded the most. It is moving in a Western direction, becoming more of a normal, civilized country. And it’s moving forward even if it’s in fits and starts, even if it sometimes muddles along. Where Belarus and Russia seem to be moving backwards in many respects. 

 

Window on Eurasia: With Regard to Ukraine, Medvedev Using Politically Incorrect Preposition 

 

Paul Goble

 

            Vienna, August 24 – Russian President Dmitry Medvedev uses the less politically correct preposition “na” when speaking about things in Ukraine than does his predecessors, Vladimir Putin and Boris Yeltsin, who in almost all instances used “v,” an apparently small thing that many in Ukraine and elsewhere see as anything but.

 

            In appointing Mikhail Zurabov as Russian ambassador to Kyiv, “Moskovsky komsomolets” reported last week, Medvedev has used the Russian formulation “na Ukraine” for “in Ukraine” instead of what has become the politically correct “v Ukraine,” something the Moscow paper says is another reason Ukrainians are unhappy with the current Kremlin leader.

 

            Vladimir Lopatin, an expert on Russian linguistics at the Academy of Sciences, told the paper that he is a supporting of using “na” – or on – because “we lived with this preposition to Ukraine for centuries.” And that reflects that “the name ‘Ukraina’ originated in the word ‘okraina’” – meaning “borderland of Russia” (www.mk.ru/politics/publications/337639.html). 

 

            “We do not say ‘in a borderland,’” Lopatin continued.  And as for the foreign ministry’s use of “na” – which the ministry’s press office confirmed was from its point of view “the correct version” -- he said, “whatever we recommend, they will all the same write what is necessary from the point of view of international relations.”

 

            While that may be the official position of the foreign ministry, “Moskovsky komsomolets” said, it is hardly a settled one within the Russian government.  Putin, it pointed out, says “v,” as has Medvedev in the past. But now the Russian president as his letters to Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko show seems to have settled on “na.”

 

            For an explanation of this shift, the Moscow paper turned to Vladimir Zhirikhin, the deputy director of the Moscow Institute of CIS countries.  He said that the president’s use of “na” is “connected to a very simple thought.  We have been living separately for almost 20 years. [And] there are now two different languages: Ukrainian Russian and Russian Russian.”

 

            “Just like American English and British English,” Zhirikhin suggested. And in “Ukrainian Russian,” people say “v Ukraine,” while in Russian Russian, people continue to say “na Ukraine.” Using “v” if one is a Russian speaker of Russian “is simply incorrect. Here there is no politics,” and Ukrainians should not try to make something of it.    

 

            But if Ukrainians shouldn’t seek a political motive in the different usages of Medvedev, ought Russians to do the same? The paper asked.  And it offered the following logic as a possible explanation: Putin “as a former intelligence officer is accustomed to communicate with people in ‘their own language’ in order to establish more confidential relations.”

 

            Medvedev, on the other hand, “as a legal specialist and teacher,” “Moskovsky komsomolets” suggested, may be more inclined to believe that “a rule is a rule and one ought not to overlook that even in the pursuit of ‘good’ relations.” But in doing that, he is departing from the rules of the game that the Russian foreign ministry continues to play by.

 

            For many English speakers, this may seem to be a tempest in a teapot, but any who think so should remember the rights a decade or more ago over whether the definite article “the” should be placed in front of Ukraine or not.  In the past, most Americans of non-Ukrainian origin had spoken about “the Ukraine.”

 

            But Ukrainian Americans and Ukrainians in other countries regularly insisted that using the article had the effect of reinforcing the notion that Ukraine was a borderland of Russia rather than a country in its own right.  On this, the 18th anniversary of Ukrainian independence, their opinions on “the” and on “v” deserve to be decisive.  

Financial Times

Russia’s botched policy in its own backyard

By Anders Åslund

Published: August 17 2009 

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have always been difficult. Since Ukraine’s Orange revolution in late 2004 they have been dismal. Conflicts have involved gas, agricultural trade, the Russian naval base in the Crimea, the war in Georgia and Ukraine’s interest in Nato. Even so, politicians from the two countries rarely meet.

Last year Vladimir Putin, then Russia’s president, escalated the conflict by publicly questioning Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He has repeated his claims as prime minister. President Dmitri Medvedev’s strident open letter to President Victor Yushchenko amounted to a further escalation, with its declaration that Russia would not send a new ambassador to Kiev. Mr Medvedev offered no constructive proposals but listed old Russian grudges, claiming that all faults lie with Ukraine. 

The language was reminiscent of Leonid Brezhnev in its detachment from reality. Mr Medvedev claimed that no Russian threat against Ukraine exists, as if he were unaware of his prime minister’s statements. He went on in Soviet vein: “Russia endeavours to be a predictable, strong and accommodating partner” to its neighbours. Well, hardly, as Mr Yushchenko noted in his response.

Mr Medvedev’s obvious aim was to influence the Ukrainian presidential elections scheduled for January, expressing hopes for improved relations with the “new Ukrainian leadership”. Mr Yushchenko is no longer a credible candidate, having proven himself an ineffective ruler. The two leading candidates are instead Yuliya Tymoshenko, the current prime minister, and Viktor Yanukovich, the former prime minister, with Arseniy Yatseniuk, the former speaker, as the only other plausible contender.

But however much effort Moscow puts into the Ukrainian elections, it is not likely to achieve its aims, as the Orange revolution illustrated. Contrary to common misconceptions, no real separatism exists in Ukraine. The Kremlin has given up on Mr Yanukovich, the leader of largely Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine, realising that no serious Ukrainian politician can be pro-Russian. Recently, the Kremlin has preferred Ms Tymoshenko as somebody they can do business with, but there is no love lost.

The Kremlin’s misunderstanding of Ukrainian politics is based on the fact that, unlike Russia, Ukraine is a democracy. The Russian leaders think they can “buy” Ukrainian politicians, but in the end they must listen to their voters, not Moscow, to gain office. This is an alien thought to the authoritarian Muscovites, who believe everything is manipulated from above and by Washington. Persistent anti-Ukrainian propaganda on Russian state television also turns eastern Ukrainians against the current Russian regime. 

Mr Medvedev’s statements appear to be a reflection of the rivalry between the Putin and Medvedev camps, which confuses all central policymaking in Russia at present. Ominously, Mr Putin has made Ukraine-bashing one of his trademarks and Medvedev needs to keep up. Russian economic policy is suffering as a result of this strife and Ukraine may do so too.

The broader problem for Russian foreign policy is that the country’s rulers do not know how to deal with their post-Soviet neighbours. Their policy objectives are mixed. Gazprom wants to monopolise gas supply, transportation and sales. Private businessmen aspire to expand their corporations. Agricultural interests block imports. Russian nationalists persist in neo-imperialism and populist politicians try to win domestic support by attacking their neighbours. 

The result is that post-Soviet nations are trying to develop relations with anybody but Russia. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are opting for gas exports to China. Most starkly, Georgia and Ukraine are turning to the west, but even Belarus, the ultimate Russian loyalist, is fed up with the Kremlin and seeking other options. 

For the west, the conclusion is that it needs to solidify its support for Ukraine regardless of who wins the elections. Fortunately, it is doing so. Joe Biden, the US vice-president, made this point clearly during his recent trip to Kiev, while the European Union is pursuing efforts at integration, notably through a forthcoming European Association Agreement on trade.

The writer is a senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and author of How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy

 

 

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