[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: FT; IHT; JIR; CoE

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The Financial Times

Yushchenko pledges to honour 'bad' gas deal

By Tony Barber in Brussels 

Published: January 28 2009 

Viktor Yushchenko, president of Ukraine, has promised to honour last week's deal with Russia to restore gas flows to Europe, in spite of his personal objections to the agreement.

Mr Yushchenko set out a vision of closer economic and energy integration with the European Union.

"Ukraine is not happy with the decisions made to settle the crisis. It's a bad deal," he told the Financial Times in an interview.

"But I want to say firmly and clearly - for us, this is a responsibility that we will not violate. Our partners should have no more headaches on this score."

The Ukrainian leader delivered an identical message yesterday in talks with José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission president, saying he wanted to modernise Ukraine's gas transit system, integrate it more closely with the EU, and avert the risk that Gazprom, Russia's giant gas company, might take control of the Ukrainian network.

EU officials expressed relief at Mr Yushchenko's promise not to undermine the deal with Russia, which was clinched in Moscow after talks between Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister, and Yulia Tymoshenko, Ukraine's prime minister and a rival of Mr Yushchenko.

Ukraine and Russia were heavily criticised in Brussels for their roles in the dispute, which cut gas supplies during a mid-winter cold snap. But Mr Yushchenko said he did not believe Ukraine's reputation or relations with the EU had been damaged.

"I would say that the gas crisis even makes the impetus for integration stronger," he said, expressing the hope that the EU and Ukraine would sign a free trade agreement and a common air space accord this year.

"We need to draw many conclusions from these damaging events. As a citizen of Europe, I say Europe must have a common gas policy, a united gas system, with rules and procedures for producers, transit countries and consumers."

Under the deal, Ukraine will pay Russia $360 per 1,000 cubic metres of gas in the first three months of this year, a sharp increase from $179.50 last year but still 20 per cent below a so-called market price of $450.

By contrast, the transit fee paid by Russia to Ukraine for sending gas to the rest of Europe will be unchanged this year at $1.70 for 1,000 cubic metres of gas per 100km. Gazprom said this fee would rise next year to about $2.50. But Mr Yushchenko complained that it would still be much lower than the $4 paid to the Czech Republic and Slovakia and the fee of up to $6 received by Germany.

He rejected suggestions that his criticism of the Moscow deal reflected a desire to protect RosUkrEnergo, a Swiss-registered intermediary in the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade which would apparently be cut out under the new arrangements.

"The Ukrainian state and Ukrainian state gas company have nothing to do with these intermediaries," he said, denying that he or his political party was connected to RosUkrEnergo.

Mr Yushchenko attacked Mr Putin for having alleged that corruption within Ukraine's government structures caused confusion in Kiev's negotiating strategy and made it harder to find a solution to the gas crisis.

"Russian corruption is bigger in scale than anywhere in Europe. Such harsh statements [about Ukraine] are simply incorrect," he said.

"The myths cranked out by the Russian government or Gazprom are apparently aimed at discrediting Ukraine as a reliable gas transport partner, to get political and commercial control of the Ukrainian gas system."

Denying allegations that Ukrainian technicians had secretly siphoned off gas that Russia had intended only for other European customers, Mr Yushchenko said: "Ukraine was never stealing, doesn't steal and will never steal gas."

International Herald Tribune

EU and Ukraine eye closer ties to avoid gas snags 


Reuters 

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 

By Marcin Grajewski

The European Union and Ukraine agreed on Tuesday to seek closer ties in the energy sector to try to avoid future disruption of Russian gas supplies through the country after this month's crisis.

Visiting President Viktor Yushchenko said that accords signed with Moscow by his domestic political rival, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko were "not easy" but gave no indication at a news conference that he would challenge them.

Many European countries were cut off from Russian natural gas for days because of an energy payment dispute between Moscow and Kiev, undermining their reliability as suppliers.

"We are all determined that this does not become an annual event," European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso told a news conference after meeting Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko in Brussels.

He said the EU and Ukraine would work on bringing Ukraine to the European Energy Community, a loosely defined body created in 2005 to ensure close cooperation within the bloc and among some neighbouring countries and to liberalise the sector.

Barroso and Yushchenko said Ukraine should also integrate its electricity grid with those of EU members from central Europe and, crucially, link better its gas transit pipelines with the EU's wholesale gas system.

"It is important for Ukraine to join the European Energy Community agreement," Yushchenko said.

He said he counted on EU countries' investment to modernise Ukraine's gas transit system, which will be discussed at a high-level conference on March 23.

Yushchenko has warned that the deal signed with Russia to end the gas dispute could bring Ukraine's state energy company Naftogaz to its knees financially and allow Russians to move in and take over property to cover the resulting debts.

Bohdan Sokolovsky, Yushchenko's energy aide, said on Monday the deal could be declared invalid if it was shown to have been concluded under pressure. But Yushchenko did not give any indication that he would challenge them, saying only:

"The agreements signed are not easy ones," he said.

Barroso and Yushchenko voiced confidence the EU and Ukraine would sign this year as planned an association agreement, which would provides for easier trade and travel, some aid, and strong economic cooperation.

Some politicians in the 27-nation are blaming Ukraine for its role in the gas crisis, saying privately Kiev had failed to pass on Russian gas when Moscow made it available.

But Barroso said the EU would not punish Ukraine.

"In our bilateral relations, we are not taking any negative consequences," he said.

The EU is generally keen to draw Ukraine away from the sphere influence of its former Soviet master, but the bloc refused to grant Kiev membership prospect as irritation grows with endless internal political rows in the country.

Jane's Intelligence Review, 

 

February 2009

 

Self-defence lessons - Ukrainian insecurity post-Georgia

 

Taras Kuzio 

 

Key Points

 

    *

 

      The January gas crisis has once again highlighted poor Russo-Ukrainian relations.

    *

 

      In the wake of the 2008 war with Georgia, Kiev remains concerned over possible Russian intervention in the Crimea.

    *

 

      While sufficient barriers to conflict currently exist, Russian interference in the Crimea is likely to increase in coming years as relations deteriorate.

 

Russia's row with Ukraine over gas in January highlighted the poor relations between the two countries. Taras Kuzio assesses Ukraine's position following the 2008 conflict in Georgia and explains why Russian interference in Crimea is likely to increase.

 

The shut-off of all natural gas going to Ukraine on 7 January 2009 has once again highlighted the fragility of Russia's relations with its neighbours.

 

While the gas dispute is partly a financial one, as Moscow and Kiev are unable to agree on a price for the gas Russia transits to its western neighbour, the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict has demonstrated that Moscow remains willing and able to use military force to achieve foreign policy goals in its near abroad.

 

That war was perceived by its neighbours as indicative of Russia's greater assertiveness since the turn of the century, following Vladimir Putin's rise to the presidency in December 1999. In Ukraine, relations with Russia have deteriorated since the 2004 Orange Revolution that brought pro-Western Ukrainian forces to power, exemplified by the 2006/07 and 2008/09 gas disputes, engendering a sense of greater insecurity. Russia's long-standing territorial claims to Ukraine's southern Crimean peninsula are of particular concern to Kiev.

 

This sense of insecurity has encouraged Ukraine to pursue NATO membership, which has created unease in Moscow over Kiev's policy direction and the perceived encroachment of institutions such as NATO in border states such as Ukraine and Georgia.

 

While conflict is not likely in the near term, Russia is likely to continue to increase its influence in Crimea, and with NATO membership currently a remote prospect, Kiev will remain concerned that in the long term a Russian military incursion into Ukraine remains a possibility within a decade.

Crimean separatism

 

>From Ukraine's point of view, the Georgian crisis opened up key questions about its own control over Crimea. Although Russia was condemned by the majority of Western states for its de facto annexation of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, following a short moratorium on dialogue, the EU and NATO re-launched relations with Moscow in November and December respectively. For Kiev, this is likely to have created a perception that such actions do not mean Russia has to pay a high price, and any such intervention in Crimea would not incur significant opprobrium.

 

Crimea has been a less fractious issue than other disputed regions in the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS), such as Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Transdniestr in Moldova and the separatist regions in Georgia, where Russian (or in Nagorno-Karabakh's case Armenian) troops act as either peacekeepers or occupation forces. In contrast, Crimea never developed into a frozen conflict in the first half of the 1990s for three reasons: the separatist movement was undermined by the efforts of the Ukrainian state; popular indifference; and internal divisions within the region's separatist movement.

 

Moscow effectively diluted the separatist movement in Crimea by upgrading the region from an oblast to an autonomous republic in January 1991 and post-independence Kiev compounded this by drawing up a constitution recognising Ukraine's territorial integrity, which was adopted by 1998. This differed significantly from Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia, whose autonomous entities were either dissolved or never offered autonomy by central governments upon post-Soviet independence, with the resultant conflict leading to bloodshed that divided national minorities from the central government.

 

Moreover, all of the Soviet security forces in Crimea were nationalised by the newly independent Ukraine. The one exception was the Black Sea Fleet, which was not divided between Russia and Ukraine until a May 1997 treaty.

 

In Moldova, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the newly independent central governments failed to take control of Soviet military units and these then transferred weapons to separatist groups who wrested control of separatist enclaves.

 

Also, Crimean separatists failed to receive mass support in Crimea because of the lack of an ethnic Russian base upon which to mobilise. Although Crimea has a slim 58 per cent ethnic Russian majority (declining from 65 per cent in the 1989 Soviet census), the Crimean population is divided between local territorial, ethnic Russian and Soviet-Pan Slavic identities.

 

In the 1990s, the Crimean Communist Party and pro-government centrist parties opposed separatism, effectively narrowing the base of support for separatism to extremist Russian nationalists.

 

This prevented the rise of a united separatist movement, creating the final undermining factor of internal factionalisation and division. The Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny: SBU) capitalised on this event and effectively subverted the separatist movement from within, compounding internal divisions between different separatist parties.

 

These factors caused the Crimean separatist movement to effectively collapse in 1995 when then-president Leonid Kuchma disbanded the Crimean presidency that had been established just the year before by his predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk.

Russian influence

 

Crimean separatism was therefore cut short before it could develop into a viable movement, owing to internal disruption and incohesion. However, while this internal situation remains the same, one vital factor has now changed that could presage a rise in separatist sentiment.

 

In the 1990s, the movement lacked external support. The administration of then-Russian president Boris Yeltsin, occupied by maintaining stability in the post-Soviet era, had little reason to support Crimea's separatists.

 

This situation is now significantly different, with numerous signs that Russia is taking an increasingly active role in Crimea. The growth of Russian nationalism and rise of nationalist youth groups within Russia, such as Nashi and the Eurasian Youth Movement, have led to the spread of their activities into Crimea. These youth groups have taken part in numerous anti-NATO and anti-United States rallies there.

 

Of particular concern for Kiev is the fact that personnel from the Russian Black Sea Fleet based at Sevastopol in Crimea have also been taking an active part in these anti-NATO protests. Russia and Ukraine have already exchanged heated words over the Black Sea Fleet, which is based in Ukraine on a temporary agreement until 2017 (despite the Ukrainian constitution banning the presence of permanent foreign military bases).

 

Kiev is already insecure about the Russian presence in Sevastopol for two reasons. First, Ukraine fears that the Black Sea Fleet will continue to be used in military interventions in the CIS, as it was in Georgia. In August 2008, two presidential decrees were signed outlining measures demanding that Black Sea Fleet vessels give advanced notice of their itineraries when outside Sevastopol. Russia has refused to abide by them. Second, Kiev is worried that Russia will not withdraw its troops from Ukraine in 2017, in a similar way that it did not from the Moldovan separatist region of Transdniestr at the end of the Vienna Agreement's term in 2003. Russia has refused Ukrainian requests to begin negotiations on a phased withdrawal over the next eight years and claims that the port of Novorosiysk, located on Russian territory, is too unsuitable to accommodate a re-located Black Sea Fleet.

 

Given this situation, and the fear of Russian personnel inciting anti-NATO protests, or even supporting Crimean separatism, it is unsurprising that new Ukrainian legislation was passed by presidential decree in August 2008 aiming to restrict the movement of Black Sea Fleet personnel in order to halt their support for separatist groups. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior (Ministerstvo Vnutrishnikh Sprav: MVS) has been instructed to detain Black Sea Fleet personnel outside their bases and then return them to their base "with the aim of preventative educative influence on other BSF personnel". The efficacy of this policy is yet to be proven; attitudes are sceptical in the Ukrainian parliament on giving the MVS the task of rounding up Black Sea Fleet personnel. Nevertheless, feelings are running high following the Georgian war, fostering support for the legislation. Oleh Bilorus, a deputy from the pro-Western Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and head of parliament's committee on foreign affairs, said: "A servicemen of another state cannot walk freely around the territory: if he does so, he is an intelligence officer, a saboteur or a tramp. The system for the stationing of such servicemen has to be restricted to within the borders of the military base."

Increasing interference

 

Despite this, there is evidence of increasing Russian interference in Ukraine, and Crimea in particular. Russian intelligence activities have already apparently resumed against Ukraine and other CIS countries. The Ukrainian presidential secretariat was hacked into in August during the Russo-Georgian war, with Kiev accusing Russian intelligence, although Moscow denies any involvement. The SBU has publicly revealed that Ukrainian citizens are the target of recruitment by Russian intelligence, including for disinformation operations. According to Ukrainian media services citing SBU sources, Ukrainian nationals have been recruited to appear on Russian television and on broadcasts from Crimea and South Ossetia stating that they are mercenaries sent to fight for Georgia or Crimean Tatars trained by Islamic fundamentalists.

 

Russian intelligence has also allegedly returned to Soviet-era KGB tactics of disinformation, planting fabricated stories in foreign media outlets or provincial Ukrainian newspapers, which are then reprinted by Kiev's national media. The Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council reported that Russian intelligence is actively involved in planting stories in Ukraine's mass media to discredit the Ukrainian leadership while supporting pro-Russian groups with the purpose of pursuing the reintegration of Ukraine into Russia's political orbit. Russia denies the allegations.

 

Perhaps most visible has been the sustained propaganda campaign launched by Russia after the August conflict in Georgia. Russia claims that Ukraine supplied large numbers of weapons to Tbilisi and that Ukrainian mercenaries fought on the Georgian side. A Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on 11 September 2008 claimed that "by supplying heavy military hardware to the Georgian army the Ukrainian side partially bears the responsibility for the bloodshed". Such claims have been echoed by the pro-Russian Party of Regions within Ukraine. Valeriy Konovaliuk, an MP from the party, received an official warning from the SBU for irresponsible use of state secrets, after he led a campaign accusing President Viktor Yushchenko of illegally supplying weapons to Georgia. The SBU intervened by preventing a documentary being shown about the delivery of military equipment from Ukraine to Georgia, made with the support of the Russian embassy.

 

Another particularly worrying development for Kiev is that the Russian government is distributing passports in the Crimea. This is similar to the policy it adopted in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. During the August conflict in South Ossetia, Moscow used the pretext of defending its own citizens when responding to the Georgian offensive. Yushchenko said on a December visit to Lithuania that Russia's new plans for issuing "Russian cards" was disturbing and issuing Russian passports is an "infringement of international law and demonstrates disrespect to other sovereign states whose territories do not permit dual citizenship".

 

Within Russia, public support for the separation of Crimea has also grown.

The Kremlin's control over mass media has provided an opportunity to mobilise the population on anti-US, anti-Georgian and anti-Ukrainian platforms. Today, only a minority of Russian citizens have positive attitudes to Ukraine and relations between both countries are at their lowest ebb since the Soviet Union collapsed, with continuing disputes over energy, the status of the Black Sea Fleet, Crimea, attitudes to Soviet history, NATO membership and many other areas. The Russian Levada Centre public opinion research organisation concluded in a September 2008 poll that there was a majority of public opinion hostile to Ukraine. Such negative attitudes could potentially be used to justify military operations such as that undertaken against Georgia in August 2008.

On to NATO

 

This increasing Russian interference in Crimea is symptomatic not only of Russia's bolstered confidence under Putin and growing capability to manage foreign policy, but also Russia's stridently anti-NATO enlargement posture.

Russian leaders and Crimean political groups, such as the Crimean Communist Party, have stated their willingness to support Crimea's separation from Ukraine if it joined NATO. Such a step could have been legitimised by the Crimean parliament's September 2008 vote to recognise South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence.

 

Ironically, as Russia's involvement in Ukraine and the Crimea has grown in line with its fears of NATO enlargement, Kiev has increasingly viewed NATO membership as a vital guarantee against potential future military adventurism by Russia.

 

The US administration of George W Bush sought to fast-track Ukraine and Georgia into NATO after the 2003 and 2004 Rose and Orange Revolutions.

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko repaired US-Ukrainian relations during an April 2005 visit to Washington, a month after which Ukraine was invited to join NATO's Intensive Dialogue on Membership Issues. Washington hoped to crown the election of an Orange coalition government in the March 2006 elections with a first visit by Bush in June, followed by an invitation for Ukraine to join a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the alliance's Riga summit the following November. This strategy collapsed, not least because of the onset of political infighting in Ukraine that has still yet to be resolved.

 

During 2006-08, the Bush administration's ability to influence NATO declined as the president increasingly became a lame duck and opposition to NATO enlargement grew in Western Europe. At the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, opposition within NATO to granting MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia was mobilised on the grounds of low public support and political instability in the former and unresolved frozen conflicts in the latter. Ukraine's frequently changing governments and elections negatively affected its ability to launch a public relations campaign supporting the advantages of NATO membership. Public support for NATO membership stood at a respectable one third in the 1990s (although heavily regionally concentrated, with low support in eastern Ukraine) but declined to 20 per cent after a US-led coalition invaded Iraq in spring 2003. Ukrainians mistakenly believed that the Iraqi operation was NATO-led because of their close association with the US and NATO.

 

At the Bucharest NATO summit, NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia would join the alliance at an unspecified future date, but a Western European group of countries led by Germany baulked at granting Ukraine a MAP. The December 2008 meeting of NATO foreign ministers took up a British proposal to bypass MAPs by developing Ukrainian reforms through the NATO-Ukraine commission established in 1997. Ukraine already has an annual Action Plan in place, launched in 2003 after the Prague NATO summit in November 2002 that incorporates similar political, economic and security reforms to those listed in a MAP.

 

Ukraine will have fulfilled seven yearly Action Plans by the December 2009 presidential elections that do not radically differ in scope from a MAP.

Steven Pifer, US ambassador to Ukraine when Action Plans were launched in

2003 at the Prague NATO summit, believes they are "95 per cent of a MAP".

Yushchenko said in December 2008: "We have in effect been functioning under a MAP for quite a long time. Ukraine completely fulfils annual target co-operation plans." The 2009 Action Plan envisages 400 activities to be carried out between Ukraine and NATO.

 

That Ukraine will continue to develop a very close working relationship with NATO is beyond doubt. However, Ukraine's NATO membership will remain a long-term goal, with little chance of accession in the near term due to the combined factors of Western European opposition, domestic political chaos and a lack of popular support.

Mitigating factors

 

Ukraine is in a risky position. The desire to enter NATO and its Action Plans ensure that relations with Russia have steadily deteriorated, yet the lack of NATO membership also makes the country vulnerable to Russian intervention and even military adventurism in Crimea. This risk is further highlighted by the increasing activities of Russian associated agencies and organisations in the region.

 

However, despite these risks, there are a number of factors that mitigate against any Crimean separatism or possible Russian action in the short term.

One is the ability of the Ukrainian security services to undermine possible Crimean separatism. The SBU has demanded that the Sevastopol branch of the Institute for CIS Countries be closed by a court order. The Moscow headquarters of the institute is headed by Konstantin Zatulin who, together with Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Moscow Mayor Luzhkov, have been banned from entering Ukraine for their pro-separatist views.

 

The SBU has also sought to ban local separatist organisations. The Peoples Front of Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia was banned because it supported a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity. Two of its leaders have been charged with the criminal code relating to threats to Ukraine's territorial integrity that provide for up to five years' imprisonment. The People's Front had been established in August 2005 and brought together 12 pro-Russian organisations. In 2007 the front began a campaign entitled "Ukraine without Crimea". Funding for the front remains mysterious, but in

2006-08 the Moscow city council donated nearly USD20 million to Crimean projects. The Rusky Mir government-funded foundation has awarded grants to pro-Russian organisations in Crimea.

 

At the state level, there are also a number of factors that could help dissuade Russia from undertaking any military intervention in Crimea. First, is the low level of animosity between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea. Although relations between both countries are at a very low level, there is no history of ethnic or religious conflict between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. In the Crimea the majority of ethnic Ukrainians are Russian speakers and tend to harbour pro-Russian, but not separatist, views. The Communist Party, for example, which has traditionally supported Ukraine's territorial integrity, draws from the Russian and Ukrainian populations.

 

The only ethnic and religious divide in Crimea is between Islamic Tatars and Orthodox Slavs. Violence has flared between them, but this usually relates to social, economic and criminal disputes, rather than ethnic or religious.

 

International public opinion would also overwhelmingly support Ukraine's position, something that could not be said about Georgia. Ukraine has never lost control over Crimea and its deployment of security forces would be seen as a legitimate action. Georgia's reinstigation of a frozen conflict in a region it had not controlled for 16 years was not seen as productive or a correct course of action by the international community. Ukraine has a good record on national minorities and peacefully resolved the Crimean issue.

Ukraine also has a longer record of co-operation with NATO and the US than Georgia; the NATO-Ukraine Commission was established 11 years ago while the NATO-Georgia Commission was only unveiled four months ago.

Ukraine en garde

 

Russia may also be reluctant to intervene in Crimea because of Ukraine's large military forces and its control over the Crimean peninsula. Georgia - unlike Ukraine - lost control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1992, 16 years before the August 2008 crisis. Russian military planners are aware that Ukraine would be in a position to quickly respond to a Russian military intervention as this would have to be largely deployed from outside Crimea by air or sea. Black Sea Fleet sailors are ill equipped for land deployment, while there are few Russian marines deployed there.

 

Unlike the separatist regions in Georgia, Crimea has no land border with Russia, and Ukrainians and Russians living in the region have no history of antagonism. Crimea also has a 15 per cent Tatar population who are easily mobilised and have a grievance over their 1944 deportation that makes them solidly anti-Russian. Tatars have many sympathies with the Chechens, who were also deported in 1944.

 

Nevertheless, small-scale clashes, provoked by Russian nationalists with or without the support of Russian intelligence, could lead to Ukrainian intervention, which could then escalate. Russia would not need a major military conflict with Ukraine; the use of targeted operations would be sufficient to destabilise the situation. Provocations could be organised to inflame relations between Crimean and Ukrainian law enforcement units, resulting in clashes that would lead to intervention by Russian Black Sea Fleet forces in defence of Russian citizens.

 

Another potential scenario could see Russian special forces take control of Sevastopol, perhaps on the eve of the end of the Black Sea Fleet treaty in 2017, giving Ukraine the option of either sending reinforcements or accepting loss of sovereignty over the port. Ukrainian intervention to re-take Sevastopol could be thwarted by large crowds of Russian supporters.

Ukraine is vulnerable to a quickly executed seizure of Sevastopol and may have difficulty in reversing such an operation. Any such Russian attempt would be more complicated and risky than the August operation in Georgia.

 

Should the situation develop to the point of direct conflict, Ukraine's military is sufficient to contest Russia in most areas and could be made ready to defeat any large-scale Russian attack with minimal outside military assistance. However, this is reliant upon Kiev following through on announced military reforms and receiving additional help with certain niche capabilities, including rapid reaction forces based around special forces, amphibious units and helicopter transportation. Such support to the Ukrainian military was the subject of a November 2008 meeting held in Tallinn between NATO and Ukraine.

 

Following the Georgian crisis Yushchenko called upon the government to increase military spending in the 2009 budget. In September 2008, the National Security and Defence Council reviewed the way Ukraine's resource-strapped armed forces are financed. Yet plans to increase spending may be thwarted by the impact of the global financial crisis, which has led Ukraine to adopt anti-crisis measures demanded as a condition for the receipt of a USD16.4 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby loan.

 

In November, Ukrainian Defence Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov announced plans to increase Ukraine's military presence in Crimea and to deploy new units on Ukraine's border with Russia. The Southern Operational Command (SOC), headquartered in Odessa, is based on the former Soviet Southern Military District, minus Moldova. Ukraine has large armed forces structures in Crimea, which fall under the division of the SOC as the region was heavily militarised in the Soviet period. The 6th Army Corps is central to the SOC and includes one airborne, one airmobile, one armoured, one artillery and three mechanised brigades. The Crimea Tactical Group in Belbek is based around the 204th Fighter Aviation Brigade operating MiG-29s for air defence and attack. Ukraine also possesses a range of additional military forces in Crimea that includes naval marines, air force and anti-aircraft missile complexes.

 

Elite National Guard units were stationed in Crimea from 1991 to 1999, but in 2000 the Guard was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. These units include some of the ministry's best-trained special forces, such as the Bars unit that guarded the presidential administration during the Orange Revolution - the unit was mistakenly reported as a Russian spetsnaz unit.

These former elite National Guards units within the Ministry of the Interior are trained in mountain and amphibious tactics to deal with separatist unrest in Crimea.

 

New military units are to be stationed along Ukraine's land border with Russia. In the Soviet period, eastern Ukraine had no military district and a Northern Operational Command (NOC) headquartered in Chernihiv on the Russian border was only created in the mid-1990s. The 8th Army Corps forms the basis of the NOC and includes one airmobile, one artillery, three mechanised brigades and a newly constituted Aviation (air defence) Regiment. The Aviation Regiment was deployed in eastern Ukraine in 2007 and provides a defensive umbrella for the economically important Donetsk region.

Conclusion

 

Ukraine's military prowess, international support and ability to undermine Crimean separatism are effective mitigating factors and act as deterrents to Russia's involvement in the Crimea in the short to medium term, despite Ukraine's vulnerability because of its lack of NATO membership.

Nevertheless, Russian rhetoric suggests that military operations in Crimea remain a policy option in the long term.

 

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has denied that Russia had any territorial claims on Ukraine and claimed the border issue had been resolved by the 1997 treaty that had been automatically extended in 2008. However, Putin also disparaged Ukraine as an artificial state set to disintegrate if it joined NATO during a speech he gave to the NATO-Russian Council in Bucharest in April 2008. This view of a delicate and disunited Ukraine is commonly held in Russia. Putin also told his NATO hosts that Ukraine was a country that had received large parts of its territory from Russia, in effect stating that Ukraine had little moral right to it. Pro-Kremlin nationalist and deputy State Duma leader Boris Zhirinovsky similarly believes that the "real Ukraine" would be one third of its current size because the remainder would return to Russia. Following the Georgian crisis, such views have raised Ukrainian insecurity about Russian intentions.

 

Russia has never reconciled itself to Ukrainian sovereignty over Sevastopol and Crimea, and Ukrainian insecurity over Russian policies towards its neighbours has heightened following the Georgian crisis. Ukraine's relations with Russia are very poor over a wide range of areas, as demonstrated by the January gas crisis.

 

A state-to-state conflict similar to the one in Georgia is unlikely in Crimea. Nevertheless, small-scale conflicts between Russian nationalist groups and Ukrainian law enforcement could lead to Russian intervention.

This would be likely to involve personnel from the Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol until 2017. Moreover, as the date for Russian withdrawal from Sevastopol approaches, and Ukraine's relationship with NATO increases, the possibility of Russian intervention will heighten.

 

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution on Gongadze Murder

January 27, 2009

PACE wants action to bring to justice those who ordered murder of Georgiy Gongadze

Strasbourg, 27.01.2009 - The investigation into the murder of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze cannot be considered solved until the "instigators and organisers" are held to account in addition to the actual perpetrators of the crime, according to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

In a resolution adopted today, the Assembly welcomed the conviction of three former Interior Ministry police officers for the murder, but said Ukrainian prosecutors should now, among other things:

* vigorously pursue authentification of the so-called "Melnychenko recordings" - in which former President Kuchma and three other senior officials allegedly discuss disposing of Gongadze - with the participation of foreign experts, so that they can be used as evidence in court if necessary;

* pursue other methods of authenticating the recordings, such as interrogating as witnesses those allegedly recorded, and comparing their discussions with actual events;

* investigate how General Pukach, the immediate superior of the convicted police officers and allegedly present at the murder, was released from custody and reportedly able to escape arrest in Israel;

* look into the unclear circumstances surrounding the death, attributed to suicide, of the late Interior Minister Yury Kravchenko shortly before he was due to be questioned in the case.

The report's author Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (Germany, ALDE) said she had done her best to broker an arrangement between Mr Melnychenko, Ukraine's Prosecutor General and the US Department of Justice to enable technical analysis of the recordings. Mr Melnychenko had requested international involvement to exclude any "foul play", she said.

 

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