[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: WH; WSJ; Economist; EDM (2); WoE

[Deychak, Orest]

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release
July 7, 2009 
 

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT THE NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL GRADUATION

Gostinny Dvor 
Moscow, Russia


Full text:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/REMARKS-BY-THE-PRESIDENT-AT-T
HE-NEW-ECONOMIC-SCHOOL-GRADUATION/


 


EXCERPT RE: Ukraine:


...And that leads me to the final area that I will discuss, which is
America's interest in an international system that advances cooperation
while respecting the sovereignty of all nations.

State sovereignty must be a cornerstone of international order. Just as
all states should have the right to choose their leaders, states must
have the right to borders that are secure, and to their own foreign
policies. That is true for Russia, just as it is true for the United
States. Any system that cedes those rights will lead to anarchy. That's
why we must apply this principle to all nations -- and that includes
nations like Georgia and Ukraine. America will never impose a security
arrangement on another country. For any country to become a member of an
organization like NATO, for example, a majority of its people must
choose to; they must undertake reforms; they must be able to contribute
to the Alliance's mission. And let me be clear: NATO should be seeking
collaboration with Russia, not confrontation....


 


Wall Street Journal Europe


http://online.wsj.com/


 


Historical Battle Lines 


Why is Russia afraid of a 300-year-old Ukrainian hero?


Op-Ed


By ADRIAN KARATNYCKY
<http://online.wsj.com/search/search_center.html?KEYWORDS=ADRIAN+KARATNY
CKY&ARTICLESEARCHQUERY_PARSER=bylineAND>  and ALEXANDER J. MOTYL
<http://online.wsj.com/search/search_center.html?KEYWORDS=ALEXANDER+J.+M
OTYL&ARTICLESEARCHQUERY_PARSER=bylineAND>  


Lord Byron, Pushkin, and Victor Hugo wrote poems about him. Liszt
composed a symphonic work in his honor, Tchaikovsky devoted an opera to
him, and Gericault painted him tied naked to a horse. In centuries past
he was a historical superstar -- a poster child for the Romantic era.

His name was Ivan Mazepa, a Ukrainian Cossack chieftain who allied with
Sweden's Charles XII to fight Russia's Czar Peter the Great at the
Battle of Poltava, 300 years ago this week.

The swashbuckling subject of Romantic-era adulation is once again
attracting attention, this time as the subject of a dispute over history
between the leaders of Russia and Ukraine. In the eyes of the Russian
state and its propagandists, Mazepa is Public Enemy No. 1 -- a turncoat
who betrayed Peter the Great, Orthodox Christianity and the unity of
Slavic peoples. Most Russian historians have judged Mazepa a traitor.
Acting under the instruction of Czar Peter, the Russian Orthodox Church
excommunicated him and placed an anathema on him, and still vilifies him
in annual Poltava services. In turn, many Ukrainian historians regard
Mazepa as an honored fighter for Ukraine's statehood. President Viktor
Yushchenko extols Mazepa as a heroic precursor of Ukraine's independence
and his image is emblazoned on the 10 hryvnia note ($1.30).

Passions over Mazepa have not been as heated in three centuries as this
year. In recent days, amid ceremonies, costumed reenactments,
conferences and television programs on the Poltava battle, Russian
demonstrators have burned him in effigy. Ukrainian patriots rallied in
Poltava on June 27 and unfurled a 30-meter by 45-meter Ukrainian flag in
his honor. And a security force of nearly 1,000 has been deployed in
Poltava and successfully staved off conflicts between the two sides.

On the surface, there is little in Mazepa's biography that would warrant
such intense feelings. He was born to a prosperous and educated family
in Polish-occupied Ukraine in 1639 and served in the Polish court until
1665, when he returned to Ukraine, eventually joining the ranks of the
Cossacks loyal to the Polish crown. In 1687, Mazepa was elected Hetman,
or chieftain, of the Cossack Host in eastern Ukraine that was loyal to
the Muscovite Czar. A prosperous magnate, Mazepa built churches and
supported the arts and education while pursuing the goal of uniting all
Ukrainian lands in a Cossack state. After years of partnership with
Peter the Great, Mazepa sensed Russia's growing ambitions were a threat
to Ukraine's sovereignty. He abruptly turned against Peter and in 1709
joined Sweden's young king, Charles XII, in a campaign against Russia.
The Swedish-Ukrainian alliance suffered a crushing defeat at Poltava.
Charles died from a battle wound and Mazepa fled to today's Moldova,
where he also died soon after.

Poltava helped shape Europe's geopolitics for three centuries. Russia's
emphatic rout of Sweden and its Cossack allies signaled its emergence as
a European superpower and ensured Russian dominion over Eastern Ukraine
for the bulk of three centuries. Peter constructed a new narrative for
his realm. Instead of being Muscovy, it was to be Russia. As such, he
and his state could claim lineage with the Kievan state called Rus that
had accepted Christianity in 988 and collapsed in the 13th century. In
one simple historical revision that complemented his opening to the
West, Peter and his realm would be transformed from Asiatic upstarts to
a European empire. Kiev would become the "mother of all Russian cities."

There was, of course, no place in this scheme for anything resembling an
independent or autonomous Ukraine. Indeed, any claim to Kiev's autonomy
or separate nationality, any Ukraine-based opposition to Russian rule,
was a direct threat to the Petrine myth and the legitimacy that it
helped confer on the Russian state. Mazepa had to go, and has never been
allowed to return to historical grace for the same reason. Every Russian
ruler has vilified him since the fateful battle at Poltava.

For Russians, Poltava without question was a great historical victory
and Russians should be free to memorialize it as such. And there is no
question that in the 17th century, national identities were ill-formed
and many inhabitants of the territory of Ukraine felt a stronger kinship
for the common Orthodox faith they shared with Russians than for any aim
of independence. But for contemporary Ukrainians, there can be no
similar ambivalence. As a young state that gained independence in 1991,
Ukraine must develop its own sense of history, its own heroes and
founding fathers. In short, it needs a common historical narrative to
bind its citizens.

Such efforts are at best benign and should excite from Russia no more
than a firmly agnostic ambivalence. But the vehemence of Russian
polemics over events and personalities three centuries old speaks to the
Russian state's interest in keeping alive the idea of the eventual
reunification of the two states. It also helps perpetuate a cultural
divide between Ukraine's Ukrainian-speaking west and the Russophone
east.

In this context, there are several reasons why Poltava resonates. First,
Mazepa and the Cossacks represent a political force that sought autonomy
and independence from Russian dominion. Second, Mazepa not only turned
against Russia, he made common cause with Sweden, i.e. with Europe and
the West. Third, for politicians like Vladimir Putin who lionize the
Russian empire and lament the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
branding Mazepa a traitor sends a not-so-subtle message that proponents
of Ukraine's statehood today are also betraying the cause of Slavic
unity.

With Russia adamantly opposed to Ukraine's integration into European
structures and with Mr. Putin on record as questioning the permanence of
Ukraine's statehood, Russia is investing significant resources on
challenging Ukraine's shaping of a separate national identity and
history. These efforts include film documentaries challenging Ukraine's
effort to commemorate Stalin's famine as a national genocide, and
financing "Taras Bulba," a big-budget epic film that depicts the
Cossacks as loyal supporters of the Russian empire and adds scenes --
absent in Gogol's 19th century novel on which the movie is based -- of
Poles as murderous barbarians engaged in pillaging and rape.

While this Russian effort to upend Ukrainian national identity is not
likely to succeed, over the short term it can help perpetuate Ukraine's
east-west divide, promoting instability and increasing Russia's
opportunities to reassert hegemony over its weak neighbor.

Until Ukraine can shape its historiography calmly and professionally
without external interference, its polity will continue to be plagued by
divisions and its society by lack of cohesion. This is why the
contemporary battle over the meaning of Poltava is as significant as the
Battle of Poltava was three centuries ago.

Mr. Karatnycky is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council of the U.S.
Mr. Motyl is professor of political science at Rutgers University in New
Jersey. 


Economist 

 

Ukraine, Russia, and Gas


Energetic blackmail

Jul 2nd 2009 | BRUSSELS 
>From The Economist print edition

Efforts to extort money to avoid another gas cut-off come to nothing



IN BLACKMAIL timing can be everything. The governments of Russia and
Ukraine have cause to ponder this after failing to extract billions of
euros from the European Union in the name of keeping Russian gas flowing
to Europe next winter.

Thanks to recession and competition from cheaper suppliers, European
demand for Russian gas has fallen. It is also summer. So right now
governments and gas companies are unusually brave over threats to cut
off the gas. They have resisted pressure to give Ukraine a huge loan
that both the Russians and Ukraine's squabbling leaders say is needed to
avoid another dispute like the one that blocked Russian gas in January,
affecting 18 of the 27 EU countries. Whether Europe's nerve will hold as
winter approaches remains to be seen. Russia supplies 42% of all EU gas
imports, and its share is rising.

In May Russia's prime minister, Vladimir Putin, told the EU that Ukraine
must have help paying for gas to fill the Soviet-era storage tanks it
uses to meet its domestic needs each winter. If Europe wanted to avoid
cut-offs, an emergency loan of some $4.2 billion would be needed, he
said. Russian officials and gas bosses added ominously that Ukraine was
so cash-strapped it might miss a July 7th deadline for paying its June
gas bill.

Ukraine's prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, also told EU officials that
$5 billion was needed to avert a fresh gas crisis. Yet the price had
fallen sharply when the Ukrainians attended a meeting in Brussels on
June 29th with officials from the EU, the IMF and other institutions to
discuss upgrading the country's creaking gas infrastructure. Sources say
that the Ukrainian envoys now wanted only $2.1 billion to ward off
trouble next winter.

The Czech Republic, which has held the rotating EU presidency in the
first half of 2009, recently sent round a "non-paper" (jargon for an
internal discussion document) that set out the case for ignoring all
demands for money. The paper's argument was that European gas companies
have contracts with Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas giant, to buy
gas at delivery points on the EU border. The cost of transit through
Ukraine is already included in the price. So it is for Gazprom to fulfil
the contracts it has signed; neither European companies nor governments
should be expected to pay twice. Sweden, which took over the EU
presidency on July 1st, is said to take a similarly robust view.

Amid the murk of contrary claims, some clear points stand out. First,
Ukraine's gas stores matter, because when it draws on them to meet
domestic demand (as it did in January) it disrupts flows in the pipes
used to ship gas from Russia to Europe. Second, a lucky few make vast
sums from Russia's trade in gas with Ukraine, much of which flows
through unmetered pipes in quantities and at prices that are secret.
Third, even a loan to Ukraine to buy winter gas might not avert a
crunch. Ukraine has used less Russian gas this year than it promised to
buy. Under "take or pay" terms common in the industry, Russia may bill
Ukraine for the unused gas. By October, that bill could reach $3
billion, which Ukraine may say it cannot pay. (The Ukrainians already
struggle to afford the cost of domestic gas subsidies; the political
cost of putting up prices would be high.) 

In short, a new gas crisis is still quite possible, and once again
Europe will have no way of knowing what lies behind it. If Russia and
Ukraine had wanted to find a way to encourage the EU to diversify away
from Russian gas, they could hardly have come up with a better one.


Eurasia Daily Monitor

July 8, 2009

EU Commission Warns Member States of New Russian-Ukrainian Gas War

Following a recent telephone conversation between the head of the
European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, and the Russian Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin, the commission urged all E.U. member states to
immediately begin filling gas storage facilities because they believe
that a new Russian-Ukrainian gas war is imminent. A source in the
commission told the Russian newspaper Kommersant on July 3 that "the
conversation between Barroso and Putin does not inspire optimism"
(Kommersant, July 3).

An emergency meeting of the E.U. coordinating group on gas took place in
Brussels on July 2 to discuss the emerging crisis. The E.U. commission
summed up the recommendations of the meeting in a statement which noted
that Ukraine's unpredictable ability to fill its gas storage facilities,
due to lack of funds, should be taken seriously and urged member states
to fill their storage facilities to capacity with gas "from all
available sources" (Kommersant, July 3). This call is bound to increase
LNG spot market sales to Europe in the coming weeks.

By the end of June the E.U. was optimistic that the terms of a loan for
Ukraine could be reached. However, the size of the loan would be $2
billion-half of the total sought by Kyiv. Moreover, the commission
attached a number of conditions to the loan, the foremost being the
restructuring of the state-owned gas monopoly Naftohaz Ukraine, in order
to improve its transparency. The commission wants to see Naftohaz split
into separate entities, which would each be responsible for different
functions such as transport, sales, production and storage.

Despite the E.U. commission's optimistic prognosis, Russian energy
experts and officials were not convinced that the problem could be
resolved in time for the peak heating season. One Gazprom official was
quoted as saying: "We heard that it would be impossible to finalize the
loan before September. This is already too late and we hope that it will
be agreed upon earlier" (www.jamestown.org/blog, July 1).

The commission's warning, however, is easier issued than complied with.
The Balkan countries do not have LNG receiving terminals, and being tied
to Russian pipeline gas, they could suffer most. Germany has been
enmeshed in a conflict with E.U. regulators over the construction of its
first LNG import terminal designed to import gas from Algeria and the
Middle East. An E.ON Ruhrgas spokesman admitted that construction will
not begin in 2009 as scheduled (www.neurope.eu, July 3).

Italy, which according to the CIA Factbook consumes 84.89 billion cubic
meters (bcm) (2007 estimate) of gas, has only one operating LNG terminal
with less than a 4 bcm receiving capacity, and is owned by ENI, the
Italian energy giant. The French GDF Suez hopes to build a second
offshore Italian LNG terminal by 2012. In the event of a new prolonged
Russian-Ukrainian gas war the Italian economy, as well as homeowners are
bound to suffer.

What was once a boom in gas storage projects in Germany and the
surrounding countries is running out of steam, as sizeable new additions
fall victim to the financial crisis. The region might get by in the long
term if the regulators enforce greater access for all players by freeing
storage from the grip of heavyweights such as E.ON Ruhrgas and Wingas.
These companies have progressively expanded underground facilities to
store more Russian gas and to maximize profits from trading seasonal
supplies. Smaller players followed suit, but they cannot maintain the
momentum as cash flows decrease, and forecasts for gas demand remains
gloomy as the economic crisis continues (www.guardian.co.uk, July 3).

In anticipation of the upcoming payment deadline for gas deliveries in
June, the Ukrainian cabinet of ministers raised the statutory capital of
the state-owned UkrEksimbank by almost $1 billion. Most Ukrainian
analysts believe that this money will be used by Naftohaz to pay the
bill and avoid any shutdown of deliveries (www.ua-energy.org, July 2).

How long Ukraine can continue using such stop-gap measures is a question
that is rightfully worrying E.U. officials. In June, the media reported
that the Ukrainian Central Bank printed more money to pay for its gas
deliveries in May - although Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko adamantly
denied this. Furthermore, the cost of the 19 bcm of gas which Naftohaz
needs to buy from Gazprom to power the compressor stations during the
height of the heating season is part of the gas transit contract signed
in January 2009. This money has already been given to Ukraine and it was
spent on shoring up the budget.

What awaits Europe in the next few months is far from clear. While
exasperation with Ukraine grows in Brussels, and while Moscow is
justified in demanding timely payment for gas delivered to Ukraine, as
well as all the penalties incurred for buying less gas than it was
contracted for in the January contract, Russia does not want to be seen
again as a villain causing undue human suffering and economic pain by
the governments and people of its largest gas and oil market.

--Roman Kupchinsky

 

Will the Ukrainian Parliament be Disbanded?

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko may return to the idea of
disbanding parliament and call snap elections. The opposition Party of
Regions (PRU), which has the largest caucus in parliament, has disrupted
parliament's work following its leader Viktor Yanukovych's failure to
form a grand coalition with Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc
(BYT). BYT is the only major force that is decidedly against holding
snap elections. Apparently, it is only the uncertainties surrounding the
legal basis of the move that prevents Yushchenko from dissolving the
legislature.

In late June, the PRU started blocking the rostrum in parliament, making
the procedure of voting physically impossible. The PRU is determined to
continue this action until Tymoshenko's coalition agrees to increase
national wages and pensions. Such a populist move is hardly possible
now, since the state coffers are empty following the 20 percent GDP
contraction in the first quarter of 2009, as Ukraine has been the nation
worst hit by the global recession within Eastern Europe and the CIS.
Tymoshenko's cabinet struggles to contain the budget deficit within the
4 percent allowed by the IMF, otherwise the IMF might delay the
disbursal of its $16.4 billion stand-by loan-without which the Ukrainian
budget will collapse. If the PRU's demands on wages and pensions are
met, the state finances may slip out of control.

The PRU understands that there is a very slim chance that its conditions
will be met. However, even if Tymoshenko bows to this pressure and
agrees to increase wages and pensions, the PRU will hardly stop its
destructive activities in parliament, as it has formulated a set of
additional demands which, if met, would dissolve the ruling coalition.
These include dismissing the ministers of interior, education and
culture (www.proua.com, June 26). These three ministers have cemented
the coalition as representatives of its junior partners, the
Self-Defense group of the Interior Minister Yury Lutsenko and several
nationalist groups. If they are removed, the coalition will cease to
exist, and Tymoshenko will be undermined as prime minister.

Yanukovych said that snap parliamentary elections should ideally
coincide with the presidential elections scheduled for January 17
(Interfax-Ukraine, July 2). However, Yanukovych has stopped short of
admitting that his party has actively disrupted parliament's work in
order to prompt Yushchenko to disband it. His "shadow finance minister"
Mykola Azarov is more forthcoming. During a recent press conference, he
admitted that the PRU would push for snap parliamentary elections if its
demands regarding wages and pensions are not met (Interfax-Ukraine, July
3).

Yushchenko has not yet reacted to the PRU's initiative, although he is
known to favor the dissolution of parliament. He is apparently uncertain
that he has sufficient legal grounds to dissolve the legislature. He
tried to do so last fall, but the BYT managed to block it with the help
of the courts, and Yushchenko subsequently suspended his dissolution
decree, through which snap parliamentary elections were scheduled for
December 7, 2008. According to the Zerkalo Nedeli weekly, Yushchenko is
considering the possibility of reviving the decree. This would be a
legally dubious option, since the constitution provides for holding snap
elections within 60 days from the signing of the respective presidential
decree, and that term has long since expired. Zerkalo Nedeli suggested
that Yushchenko might issue a new decree to dissolve parliament based on
its inability to function, partly since Tymoshenko's coalition lacks a
majority (Zerkalo Nedeli, July 4).

There is little time remaining for Yushchenko to consider these options.
According to the constitution, the president may not dissolve parliament
within six months of his term expiring. Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr
Lytvyn said that Yushchenko can dissolve parliament on July 24 at the
latest, as his term should expire on January 23, 2010 (www.proua.com,
July 6). If Lytvyn is correct and the PRO's goal was to prompt
Yushchenko to dissolve parliament, then they left it too late to
obstruct its functioning. One indisputable legal option for the
president to dissolve the legislature is in the event that it proves
unable to work for one month, but the blockade of the rostrum by the PRU
started on June 26, and there will be less than 30 days until July 24.

The PRU is so fixed on snap elections because its popularity has
probably peaked, while that of the BYT is set to slump as it steers the
government during a period of deep economic crisis. According to the
latest opinion poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology,
the PRU would secure 37 percent of the vote had the elections been held
in June, while the BYT would muster only 21 percent, followed by the
party of former speaker Arseny Yatsenyuk with 15 percent. Moreover, the
poll showed that Yatsenyuk's party might defeat Tymoshenko's in her
stronghold of West Ukraine (Ukrainska Pravda, July 2).

--Pavel Korduban

 Window on Eurasia: Putin-Medvedev Regime 'Proto-Fascist,' Ukrainian
Analyst Says

 

Paul Goble

 

            Vienna, July 7 - Despite the hopes of many in the West for a
more progressive approach from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the
Moscow "tandem" of Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin represents
a form of "proto-fascism," one that will only get worse for both its
people and the surrounding countries unless Western countries adopt a
tough line.

 

            In Kyiv's "Den'" on July 4, Ukrainian commentator Volodomyr
Lesnoy said that the current Russian regime can best be classified as
"proto-fascist," a system he defines as one "in which the
characteristics of fascism exist in an incomplete form" but which are
sufficiently developed that they recall "the first stage of fascism"
(www.day.kiev.ua/276377). 

 

            While many analysts had pointed to fascistic elements during
the presidency of Putin, Lesnoy continued, most of them expected that
the situation would improve under Medvedev. But that has not happened,
and the situation, after a brief period of apparent improvement, has
"begun a [new] attack on civic freedoms."

 

            As in the early stages of fascism elsewhere, in today's
Russia, Lesnoy pointed out, "perfectly peaceful demonstrations have been
cruelly suppressed, and supporters of freedom of speech have recalled
that this freedom must now be understood [in Russia] just as it was
treated in the USSR."

 

            Moreover, he continued, the creation of the commission for
the struggle against the falsification of history and "threats to pursue
both Russians and foreign citizens" who violate Moscow's understandings
in this area, "the Kremlin is now forming an extremely important
attribute of fascism - an aggressive state ideology."

 

            Also similar to the beginnings of fascism elsewhere, he
noted, "the foreign policy of Moscow has become still more selective,"
restrained and positive in relations with some countries and "openly
aggressive in relation to others," especially toward "countries which
emerged from the USSR in 1991 and which conduct independent foreign and
domestic policy."

 

            One reason for this rapid descent, Lesnoy suggested, is to
be found in amazingly rapid rise of Putin himself.  The former president
and current prime minister "is not an hereditary or career politician,
who gradually rose up the political ladder." Instead, he is someone who
rose unexpectedly quickly and thus manifests "the syndrome of
Bonapartism."

 

            That syndrome is something, Lesnoy argued, that "the
majority of authoritarian leaders suffer from: with confidence in their
own genius and infallibility and with the conviction that there is
nothing impossible and that they can win at any price and by any means
because victors are not judged."

 

            Such attitudes in a leader, the Ukrainian commentator
suggested, "threaten problems in the future both for Russia itself and
for [those who are] its neighbors." And that is all the more likely
because "judging by everything, the Putin regime or its followers is
going to be in place for a long time to come."

 

            Russia will overcome the economic crisis, Lesnoy said, "and
the laurels of the savior of the nation will be laid on Putin after
which he will have the chance to become a lifetime national leader of
'vozhd' on pension, to whom future leading politicians will come for
advice and guidance."

 

            But Putin's personality and background are not the only
causes of Russia's "adventurous aggressiveness." Another reason is the
country's "essential weakness." It remains "a colonial but in
civilizational terms, a backward country," one in which many of the
minorities will continue to strive for independence."

 

            And because of that, Lesnoy went on, "the struggle with
separatism will require enormous financial expenditures and human
resources, neither of which the Russian Federation has in abundance."
Indeed, over time, it will become ever more obvious that "the enormous
territory is both the wealth of its Russia and its curse."

 

            Moreover, Lesnoy pointed out, "the Russian economy except
for oil and gas is terribly weak. If the Russians had to pay for oil and
gas as Ukraine does, then their country would collapse in the course of
four or five years," especially since "the Russian ethnos is in a deep
existential crisis."

 

            What happens next both inside Russia and in Moscow's
relations with its neighbors depends on what the Western democracies say
and do, Lesnoy argued.  "If they do not draw clearly a line beyond which
Russia's adventures will not be tolerated, then in the future, they will
have the same kind of problems with Russia that they had with Nazi
Germany."

 

            And what is most disturbing, Lesnoy concluded, is that the
"roots of fascism in Europe and in the world have not been destroyed."
Consequently, if that kind of system is established in Russia, "the
bacilli of fascism could again lead to a pan-European epidemic," with
all the tragic consequences that would involve.

 

 

President Obama in Moscow: Prospects for Ukraine and the Region:
http://usukraine.org/events/obamavisitsmoscow070709.shtml

 

 

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