[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: CSM; BBC; EDM

[Deychak, Orest]

 Eurasia Daily Monitor

June 12, 2009

Russia's Ideological Crusade Against Ukraine

According to an interview with Ukraine's Ambassador to Russia Konstantyn Hryshchenko, the country's bilateral relationship with Russia has sunk to its lowest level since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, testimony to the Russian state control of the media and its ideological crusade against Ukraine (www.profil-ua.com, June 6). In the weekly Glavred magazine on May 20 its front cover declared: "Beware Ukrainophobia!"

The Levada Center recently found that 62 percent of Russians hold a negative view of Ukraine with only the United States and Georgia being seen in a worse light. At the same time, 91 percent of Ukrainians hold positive views of Russia, a reflection of media pluralism and the lack of state directed propaganda against Russia. Analyzing these polls, the head of the Center for Military-Political Research in Kyiv summarized this relationship in his headline: "We like them but they do not like us" (www.pravda.com.ua, May 5).

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) is openly raising the question of the intensification of Russian intelligence activities within Ukraine, and Russia's return to Soviet KGB tactics. This concern was expressed in SBU chairman Valentyn Nalyvaychenko's comment that the FSB within the Black Sea Fleet should withdraw from the Crimea (www.radiosvoboda, June 2). Nalyvaychenko explained that one of the functions of the SBU was counter-espionage, and that was why they did not agree with the FSB being based in the Fleet.

The main suspects of the murder in Odessa on April 17 of a student member of the Ukrainian nationalist NGO Sich, Maksym Chayka, belong to the "Antifa(scist)" NGO financed by the Russian nationalist Rodina party. The presidential secretariat requested that the SBU investigate their activities to discover if they are coordinated "with foreign organizations of an anti-Ukrainian orientation" (www.president.gov.ua, April 22). The SBU appealed to the justice ministry to consider if there were grounds to revoke Rodina's registration, based on among things, their link to organized crime and financing from abroad. The suspects have fled to Russia.

The conflict between the Sich and Antifa NGO's is historically based; specifically the controversy surrounding the unveiling of a monument to Empress Catherine in Odessa in October 2007. Ambassador Hryshchenko pointed out that unlike the constant Russian interference in Ukraine, Kyiv does not protest against Russian glorification of Tsar Peter and Tsarina Catherine -even though both are regarded very negatively in Ukraine. Ukrainian history equates both Russian leaders as the destroyers of the Ukrainian autonomous Hetmanate in the late eighteenth century and the re-organization of Ukrainian territories into gubernia, as well as the introduction of serfdom and the banning of the Ukrainian language.

The Russian foreign ministry assumes the right to condemn the unveiling of monuments to historical figures in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine will unveil a monument to Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa on Independence Day (August 24) in his home region of Poltava on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, where Ukrainian-Swedish forces were defeated by Russia. Mazepa has undergone rehabilitation as a hero in independent Ukraine, and his picture is displayed on the 10 hryvnia note.

The Russian Orthodox Church imposed an "anathema" on Mazepa and he was condemned as a "traitor" to Russian-Ukrainian unity by tsars and commissars alike. The on-going furore has led to a split within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) with Metropolitan Dmytruk, the head of the UOC's foreign relations, supporting the growing call to remove the church's anathema (www.pravda.com.ua, May 26).

Russia's new historiography incorporates additional Russian chauvinists, such as White Army General Anton Denikin. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's recent reference to Denikin's description of Russia and Ukraine as "great" and "little" Russia shows the degree to which these Russian views of Ukraine remain deep seated. Putin's use of "little Russia" infuriated all shades of Ukrainian opinion. As Ukrainian historians pointed out, Denikin hated "Ukrainian separatism" more than he did the Bolsheviks, and this was his undoing. Denikin's march on Moscow was foiled by uprisings in Ukraine, where his forces terrorized everything Ukrainian (www.unian.net, May 28).

Memoirs published in the West after the Russian revolution by white Russian émigrés described "Ukrainian separatism" as an "Austrian" plot against Russia. "Ukrainian separatism" in the 1990's evolved into a "Western plot," while two thirds of Russians in January 2005 believed that the Orange Revolution was an "American conspiracy" (see the critical review of the new anti-Ukrainian book "American Salo [pork fat]" www.unian.net, May 29).

These views of Ukraine's "artificiality" and "fragility" remain deeply rooted within the Russian mindset, and explain the state orchestrated campaign depicting Ukraine as a "failed state" that requires international supervision. Putin described Ukraine as an "artificial" entity with lands given to it by Russia and the USSR during his speech to the NATO-Russia Council in Bucharest in April 2008. The March 16 issue of Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky's Ruskyi Zhurnal was devoted to "Will Ukraine Lose its Sovereignty?" (www.russ.ru).

Ukraine's former Ambassador to the United States Yuriy Shcherbak, wrote a lengthy analysis of the campaign conducted by senior Russian officials. Shcherbak believes that the aim is an "ideological-propaganda preparation of a future operation for the seizure of the territory of a sovereign state" (Den, May 26).

One of the Russian officials named by Shcherbak was the director of the Institute for CIS Countries Konstantin Zatulin, who recently called upon Russia to see ethnic Russians in Ukraine "in the same rank as the army, the fleet and church" (www.russkie.org). Zatulin was again denied entry to Ukraine at Simferopol airport. The SBU spokesperson explained this by saying that Zatulin remained on a banned list of Russians entering Ukraine. More importantly, "The stance of the SBU on this question is very tough: independent of the citizenship and position held (of the person) there is no place in Ukraine for separatists and extremists" (www.pravda.com.ua, June 6).

In their rush to "reset" the button with Russia after its invasion of Georgia and Barack Obama's election, Brussels and Washington have ignored Russia's ideological crusade against Ukraine. They should heed the warning from Ambassador Shcherbak, who believes Russia's ultimate aim is to "destroy Ukrainian statehood" (Den, May 26).

--Taras Kuzio

Christian Science Monitor

June 10, 2009

A wake-up call for Georgia, Ukraine - and the West

Bickering and divisiveness among democrats within former Soviet states could lead to authoritarian, anti-Western rule.

By Denis Corboy, William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz

 

London; Washington; and Hanover, N.H

The West has a large security and economic stake in the outcome of a little-known crisis in Georgia and Ukraine right now. 

The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and later the Orange Revolution in Ukraine raised high hopes around the world for democracy in the former Soviet Union. 

But since then democratic forces - torn by personal animosities and corrupt interests - have put the future of both countries at risk. In Russia, it was bickering among democrats that eased the way for Vladimir Putin to return Russia to an authoritarian path. 

Moscow is now exploiting this vulnerability in Ukraine and Georgia by demonizing democrats, aiding their opponents, and abetting separatists. The failure for democrats within those countries to work together could lead to authoritarian or anti-Western rule. 

If Ukraine and Georgia are going to steer clear of that, they must now make hard choices. 

In Georgia, US-educated President Mikheil Saakashvili made reforms but then dismissed opposing views and stifled some media and debate. Former compatriots in the Rose Revolution now lead opposition parties. They have blockaded streets and stopped some trains. Tens of thousands of demonstrators packed a football stadium on Georgia's national day, May 26. 

Last month the US and the European Union urged the opposition to negotiate reforms. This was largely ignored. Instead, much of the opposition demands the immediate resignation of the Georgian president. Polls show he retains the support of only two-fifths of Georgians. The risk of violence is a serious concern. A Georgian military unit mutinied, and a hand grenade exploded at an antigovernment television station. 

Ukraine's current President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko catalyzed democratic forces in the Orange Revolution and then led reforms. But corruption sapped much of the benefits of rapid economic growth and the east-west divide within Ukraine persists. The two leaders became bitter foes. Mr. Yushchenko has gone out of his way to irritate Moscow, while Ms. Tymoshenko has flirted with a coalition that would tie Ukraine closer to Russia. And that's just the scratching the surface. 

What lessons do these political tales of woe teach?

First, the Stalinist legacy of pervasive fear which fueled political and social distrust still impedes open debate even though it strengthens countries. 

In the wake of a disastrous war with Russia last August and an economic downturn, fissures in Georgia have grown. Debate has helped Georgians come to grips with them. Mr. Saakashvili has wisely avoided a repeat of his 2007 crackdown on peaceful protests and the free media. 

The need now is for serious negotiations between sides, and democratic solutions. In Ukraine, open discourse is facilitating tough economic decisions enabling International Monetary Fund support and modulating inter-regional tensions. 

The second lesson is that disunity and weakness carry risk at a time when both countries' futures hang in the balance. Blood-letting among democrats in Ukraine weakens their ability to resist Russian pressure on energy transport and Crimea's status. Similar acrimony in Georgia inhibits political conciliation and the development of a loyal and apolitical military. 

Appeals are being issued, mainly to the United States, to call local leaders to the woodshed to force resolution of political impasses. Just last week, for example, Yushchenko met with G-7 ambassadors in Kiev (Kyiv) and urged their governments to help save democracy in Ukraine. 

But this would not be effective. Politics in Ukraine and Georgia are complex and not well understood by foreigners. Besides this, and perhaps because of this, their counsel is rarely heeded. 

In August 2008, Saakashvili ignored repeated warnings, even from the US president, to avoid military confrontation with Russia. In Ukraine, Orange Revolution leaders have turned a deaf ear to the counsel of Western countries and Ukrainian diasporas to seek accommodation and fight corruption. 

The hard lesson for Georgia and Ukraine is that governments and citizens must summon courage and solve their own problems. Leaders should make reform their main agenda. If they can't or won't do this, they ought to step aside. A new generation of leaders - young enough never to have been schooled in Soviet ideology - may be better able to contain retrograde forces and carry the banner of reform. Ukraine and Georgia have promising candidates. 

The US and Europe, meanwhile, must do more to improve conditions for reform - and not disdain prospects for democratic change in troubled areas. The best tool is expanded assistance to foster the rule of law, honest elections, respect for human rights and minorities, and the fight against corruption. Advances in these areas should precede - and will enable - closer ties to the European Union and NATO, not the other way around. 

Ukraine and Georgia must fashion their own futures and find leaders who can cooperate for democracy. Street demonstrations, economic crises, and Russian pressure should be a powerful wake-up call. Unless democrats unify, backward-looking forces could take hold - as has happened in Russia, to the detriment of US and European interests. 

Denis Corboy is director of the Caucasus Policy Institute at Kings College London and was European Commission ambassador to Georgia. William Courtney was US ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia. Kenneth Yalowitz is director of the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College in Hanover, N.H., and was US ambassador to Belarus and Georgia. 

BBC News

 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8091737.stm

How 1989 fanned flames in Ukraine 

By Olexiy Solohubenko 
Europe editor, BBC World Service 



As the 1989 revolution swept through the countries of Central Europe, tremors went right across the Soviet Union. 

At that time, in the Baltic states as well as in Ukraine, the prospects of independence suddenly looked very real. 

In a richly decorated office in central Kiev, Leonid Kravchuk is happy to talk about 1989. Then a senior functionary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, he says it was totally unprepared for grassroots protests. 

"We were in a full session of the Central Committee one day," he tells the BBC, "when someone ran up and said, 'There are two women with a placard outside!' My God, we stopped the session and I was sent down to investigate. 

" Gorbachev decided to let a little bit of genie out of the bottle. But you cannot let out just a little bit " 
Poet Ivan Drach 

"It turned out they wanted money for a rail ticket," he laughs. "And so had decided to attract attention in this manner. I gave them 40 roubles, but the whole Central Committee was spooked by two women with one placard. There was fear because no-one ever stood against the Party." 

It was the time of glasnost, of openness in the media which the then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced. Poet Ivan Drach took it very seriously. 

He says he knows exactly how many people could fit into the hall at the Writers' Union headquarters in the leafy part of Kiev: 167. 

"When we spoke here about the need for change, the hall was always full," Drach says. "And soon we needed bigger halls, but they were also not large enough." 

No easy ride 

So in smoky rooms, writers like Drach decided the time was right for bigger things - and they founded Rukh, or "Movement" in Ukrainian. 

At first Rukh's aims were to support Gorbachev's reforms against the die-hard regional party elites, but very quickly it became clear that the authorities in Moscow were neither controlling the situation nor capable of grasping what they had unleashed. 

"Gorbachev decided to let a little bit of genie out of the bottle," laughs Ivan Drach. "But you cannot let out just a little bit. It is just like toothpaste - once you squeeze it out, you cannot put it back into the tube." 

What had started as a loyal grassroots group in time evolved into a political movement demanding full independence. This frightened quite a few people, even those who had opposed the Soviet regime for years. 

Semyon Gluzman spent 10 years in gulag camps and exile for exposing the abuses of Soviet psychiatry. In his tiny office at Kiev's main psychiatric hospital with all kinds of awards and accolades displayed on the walls, he says he had genuine fears. 

"I will be honest, I thought this country could be more repressive, more anti-Semitic and the party machine here could create its own independent fiefdom and run it the way they wanted. I am glad I was wrong, and Ukraine is more democratic and freer than I thought it would be." 

Yet, independence was not an easy ride. The communist authorities wanted to keep power, by force if necessary. 

Phone warning 

Threats and intimidation were nothing unusual. "I could write a book about them," says Ivan Drach. "And the threats were really nasty. As soon as I spoke sharply about the need to break away from Moscow, my son was badly beaten." 

Even high rank did not provide immunity. Leonid Kravchuk, later elected the first president of independent Ukraine, tells of his and Boris Yeltsin's escape from a hunting lodge in Belarus in December 1991, where they discussed the break up of the Soviet Union with their Belarussian host Stanislav Shushkevich. 

"Boris Yeltsin took me to one side," reminisces Kravchuk, "and told me that we should fly home immediately. We got into our cars, boarded our planes and took off, but did not tell the air traffic control of our routes. Simply, Boris Yeltsin got a phone call from Moscow warning him of danger." 

Of course people in Ukraine were watching events in countries like Poland closely. Writer Andrei Kurkov travelled there at the time, mostly to the mining areas in Silesia. 

" We were romantics, we believed we would change the world quickly... of course it was an illusion " 
Yuri Scherbak 

"I envied the Poles," he says over tea at his dacha outside Kiev. "I thought they were 10 years ahead of us. But then things in Ukraine took off really quickly." 

Many in Ukraine argued that it was much easier for the Poles: one nation, one language, one religion, its own Pope and fairly recent memories of freedom. 

Ukraine was and still is a more diverse if not divided country. Ukrainian and Russian compete for linguistic dominance, eastern and western regions compete for power and there are all sorts of ecclesiastical splits that would take ages to explain. 

'Small steps' 

Yet, there was one powerful, uniting factor for all Ukrainians: Chernobyl. 

The degree of lies, secrecy and disregard for people's lives after Chernobyl critically undermined whatever was left of trust in the authorities. 

A powerful Green Movement was formed. It could easily bring tens of thousands of people out onto the streets and the authorities could do nothing about it. 

Very quickly the Green demands merged with those of Rukh - a better, freer and cleaner Ukraine in every sense of the word. 

Yuri Scherbak, a doctor, a writer and later a diplomat was one of the key figures of the Chernobyl movement. 

"It was such an amazing time," he tells me in his top floor flat where his desk is adorned with pictures of him with US presidents and other top politicians. 

"We were romantics, we believed we would change the world quickly. Of course it was an illusion." 

Indeed, it was naïve to believe Ukraine would become a European democracy overnight, but in terms of freedom, according to Semyon Gluzman, it is doing much better than most other ex-Soviet states. 

"What we need is small steps", he says. "In fact, I am a specialist in small steps." 

There have also been big leaps in Ukraine over the past 20 years: it may still be building its identity as a nation, but it has a functioning state, relatively free media and, even though it is still a poor country, there have been marked improvements in the standard of living. 

The global crisis is hitting Ukraine very hard, and an IMF pledge to help with $16bn (£10bn) may not be enough to put its export-based economy back on track. 

In 1991, two years after Leonid Kravchuk's Central Committee meeting was disturbed by those two women with a placard, I was standing in what is now Independence Square in central Kiev. Next to me was a huge statue of Lenin - but a Lenin with a difference. 

Daubed in red paint, with the word "hangman" written across him, he did not survive long. 

A week or so later a crane lifted the Lenin off the pedestal and transported him into oblivion. 

Over the years Ukraine has travelled a long way, but looking now at the challenges facing it - in the economy and, crucially, in sorting out its messy politics - I keep feeling that winching away Lenin was actually the easy bit. 

 

 

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