[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: WP (lead editorial); EDM; WoE; correction

[Deychak, Orest]

The Washington Post 

http://www.washingtonpost.com 

Editorial

Russia's Reset; Mr. Obama isn't contemplating change solely on the part
of the United States. 

30 March 2009

FINAL

A16

WITH A FIRST presidential meeting set for this week between Barack Obama
and Russia's Dmitry Medvedev, it appears that the two sides may have
different ideas of what to expect from the "reset" in relations that the
Obama administration has promised .

The Russian view seems to be that the resetting has to come primarily
from the Americans. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov furthered that
impression in an interview with the Financial Times last week.
"Practically on any problematic issue which we inherited from the past
eight years, I understand the Obama administration is undertaking a
review which we welcome," Mr. Lavrov said. Russian officials appear to
hope that such a review will mean less U.S. pressure to form a united
front against Iran's development of a nuclear weapon and, above all,
acceptance of a Russian "sphere of influence" over countries that were
once part of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact -- what Mr. Medvedev
has called "a region of privileged interest."

Indications from Washington, recently reinforced by Mr. Obama, suggest
that his administration does not share this view of a one-sided need for
change. The administration is hoping for improved relations across a
range of issues, including Iran, Afghanistan, and fighting terrorism and
the spread of nuclear weapons. It will be more willing than the Bush
administration to engage in arms control talks, especially to extend the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires at the end of this year.
But Mr. Obama has given no signs of being less alarmed than was
President George W. Bush about Iran's nuclear program and certainly has
shown no willingness to acquiesce in the "privileged" position that Mr.
Medvedev claims over his neighbors.

On the contrary, at the same time that Vice President Biden introduced
the "reset" concept, in a speech in February in Munich, he also
repudiated the concept of spheres of influence. And after meeting with
the secretary general of NATO last Wednesday, Mr. Obama reiterated the
point. "My administration is seeking a reset of the relationship with
Russia," the president said, "but . . . we are going to continue to
abide by the central belief that countries who seek and aspire to join
NATO are able to join NATO." The message: Georgia and Ukraine, former
Soviet republics, should be free to form and join alliances as they
choose, notwithstanding Russia's vitriolic objections.

The administration believes, in other words, that it can develop
constructive relations with Russia without sacrificing the interests of
Russia's neighbors. Whether such a reset will be acceptable to Mr.
Medvedev or to Russia's de facto top ruler, Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin, remains to be seen.

Eurasia Daily Monitor

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/

March 27, 2009

Opening Salvos of a New Gas War: Russia Versus the EU and Ukraine 

Roman Kupchinsky

The Ukrainian - EU agreement on renovating the main Ukrainian gas trunk
pipeline signed in Brussels on March 23 was greeted with a virulent
reaction from Moscow. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who runs
his countries gas sector with an iron fist, threatened to "review"
existing gas supply contracts and prices with EU states and Ukraine
(UNIAN press agency March 24) as well as relations with the EU and
Ukraine. The ostensible reason for Putin's reaction was that Russia was
not included in the deal.

According to the EU-Ukrainian agreement, the EU would allocate $2.57
billion towards the renovation of the pipeline. Ukrainian Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko asked that the renovation include expanding the present
through-put capacity of 145 billion cubic meters of gas annually by 58.6
billion. The deal includes a basic demand put forth by Ukraine that EU
gas companies would now buy Russian gas at the Ukrainian-Russian border
and pay Ukraine the transit fee.

This would de-facto integrate the Ukrainian pipeline into the EU gas
transportation system, a major defeat for Putin's conception of creating
a gas pipeline consortium with Russian participation which would manage
the Ukrainian system, but allow Ukraine to maintain ownership of the
pipeline. However, the Putin plan called for Russia to insure the
transit of its gas to Europe through Ukraine with Russia paying Ukraine
the transit fee.

The vice chairman of the European Regulators' Group for electricity and
gas (ERGEG), Walter Boltz, told the newspaper Kommersant on March 25,
"In reality there are no reasons why Russia should insure transit (of
gas) and why we shouldn't pay for transit. We buy gas at the
Ukrainian-Russian border and worry about its delivery ourselves. I
believe there is no alternative."

At the heart of the matter are a number of issues vital for Russian
interests; maintaining its gas hold over Europe and its geopolitical
goal of bringing Ukraine into Russia's sphere of influence. If the
through-put capacity of the Ukrainian pipeline is expanded by almost 60
billion cubic meters there would be no commercial justification for
building either the Nord Stream or South Stream pipelines. The cost of
upgrading the Ukrainian pipeline is estimated at about $5-7 billion, far
less than the estimated $12 billion needed to build Nord Stream and the
$13 billion needed for South Stream.

In his reaction to the EU-Ukraine agreement to expand the Ukraine
pipeline, Putin lashed out by asking the far from rhetorical question:
"Nobody asked us if we are ready to transport such quantities (of gas)"
(UNIAN, March 24). Was this a threat or a bluff by Putin, the hidden CEO
of Gazprom? More likely than not, it was an emotional outburst based on
rational fear. If Nord Stream and South Stream are doomed by an
expansion of the Ukrainian pipeline, then the Nabucco pipeline might
become far more acceptable for those EU member states who had already
signed up for South Stream.

With European demand for Russian gas down by 40 percent in February 2009
from a year ago, Gazprom is now caught in a dangerous cash flow
situation and has already warned that it would reduce its vitally needed
investment program into exploring for new fields -yet the company
continues to pour money into building its new skyscraper in St.
Petersburg and announced that it would take its option on buying from
Italy's ENI the remaining 20 percent of Gazpromneft at the current price
of $2.1 billion in April 2009 (Kommersant, March 25).

Putin's threat to unilaterally "review" the price of gas for the EU and
Ukraine is a more direct form of intimidation. This can be done only if
Russia decides to abandon the existing price based on oil products and
devises a new pricing formula, one based on political and financial
considerations convenient to Gazprom.

By March 25, the pressure mounted on the Ukrainian government. Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev told the Russian National Security and Defense
Council that he was cancelling "indefinitely" a meeting between Russian
and Ukrainian negotiators to discuss, among other matters, a loan
request for $5 billion from the Ukrainian side. Part of the $5 billion
was to be used by Ukraine to pay Russia for gas purchases in 2009
(Kommersant, March 25).

In the meantime, Yulia Tymoshenko headed to Japan for a meeting with
Japanese corporations and banks to discuss possible loans and greater
Japanese investments into Ukraine (Ukrayinska Pravda, March 25)
Tymoshenko can well be looking to Japan to extricate her from a
potentially embarrassing refusal by Russia to lend her government $5
billion for which has personally lobbied.

Within Ukraine, the agreement with the EU was instantly criticized by
the largely pro-Russian Party of Regions. The shadow cabinet's energy
minister, Yuriy Boyko, went on the air where he supported Putin's views
and argued that "Without the full inclusion of Russia, the main supplier
(of gas) it is impossible to guarantee that the Ukrainian gas
transportation system will receive any gas. Ignoring Russia's concerns
is contrary to Ukraine's interests" (Ukrayinska Pravda, March 23).

Despite Boyko's reservations, most energy analysts see the agreement as
a major breakthrough in cleaning up the murky, corruption ridden gas
transport schemes which some attribute to Boyko and his constant
lobbying of shady middleman schemes. What is certain is that Gazprom and
Vladimir Putin will fight this new arrangement tooth and nail in order
to keep the Ukrainian pipeline system linked as close as possible to the
Kremlin in order to prolong the millions of dollars of hidden rents
which benefit both Russian and Ukrainian elites.

Window on Eurasia: Putin has Left Russia without Friends in the Region,
Moscow Commentator Says

 

Paul Goble

 

            Vienna, March 27 - Vladimir Putin because of his hatred for
Ukraine, Estonia, and Georgia has managed to leave Russia without any
allies in the former Soviet space, a remarkable performance and one that
means Moscow now must try to intimidate these countries to get its way
or yield to others in ways many Russians would fine offensive.

            This is a remarkable performance, Vladimir Nadein points out
in today's "Yezhednevny zhurnal," one that is almost unprecedented.
"Even Hitler," even when it was obvious that he was losing the war
"retained allies up to the end of 1944. But Putin, after ten years of
uninterrupted rule doesn't have any" (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8926).

            Instead of following "the first rule of ancient diplomacy:
assemble around oneself more friends and thus destroy more quickly the
coalition of enemies, Putin has pursued a policy that has offended and
driven away Russia's neighbors and not gained Russia many of the
advantages it might have gotten had it not followed Putin's lead.

            And as a result, with the possible exception of China,
Belarus and Kazakhstan, about whose attitudes toward Russia there are
still "some doubts," "all other countries bordering us are clearly not
disposed in our favor," something that Nadein insists did not have to
happen and that could be reversed with different policies.

             "To deny this would be stupid," the longtime journalist
argues, and consequently, Putin and those around him have tried to
suggest that this is the way things "ought to be" - "a kind of
diplomatic variant of the Stalinist maxim according to which the class
struggle sharpens as the country advances toward socialism." 

            But however that may be, "a diplomacy which leaves one's
country in such isolation deserves the very lowest grade." And nowhere
is this situation worse than with regard to Ukraine, a country in whose
presidential elections Putin openly interfered and whose history he and
those around him were openly, unnecessarily, and counterproductively
offensive.

            After detailing Putin's comments in Bucharest about Ukraine
as a state and his failure in the gas war, something which set more
Ukrainians against Moscow and drove them ever closer to the Europeans,
Nadein devotes most of his article to something few Russian commentators
have discussed in such detail: Putin's offensive approach to the
Ukrainian terror famine.

            "It is difficult to think up something more offensive for
any nation than the relationship that official Moscow [under Putin's
guidance] has taken toward this greatest of human misfortunes," the
death of millions of people through starvation caused by the policies of
the Soviet state, the Moscow journalist says.  

            Not only did Dmitry Medvedev refuse to go to Kyiv for the
commemoration of this tragedy, but he and the Moscow propaganda machine
condemned the Ukrainians for "unleashing an anti-Russia psychosis" by
insisting that the terror famine was a genocide, something Moscow says
cannot be true because people of other nations and in other republics
died as well. 

            But that is a fundamentally fraudulent and offensive
argument, Nadein says.  "The terrible famine in the Don and in
Kazakhstan in no way deprives the Terror Famine [in Ukraine] of features
of a genocide. The Hitlerites methodically destroyed gypsies, but no one
on that basis denies that they conducted a genocide against the Jews."

            And Putin's and Moscow's efforts to deny this by citing
Western "authorities" who are not authorities and by talking about
mistakes in the pictures in exhibitions, the journalist continues, are
offensive on their face and do no credit to Russia and the Russians,
whatever the prime minister and his entourage think.

            But there is a precedent for what Putin has done: "For many
years in the Soviet Union, its officials denied the world recognized
fact that the main victims at Baby Yar were Kyivan Jews. The censors [at
that time] permitted only a single formula to describe what happened
there: 'Soviet citizens died.'" 

            Nadein says that he "never understood" why Soviet officials
thought that was something that brought them advantage.  And he adds
that he does not understand why Putin and his government are continuing
a similar outrage against truth and against the feelings of Ukrainians
and others who have suffered so much. 

            Nadein's article is important on for three reasons. First,
it links these unfortunate policies directly to Putin and thus opens the
way for Medvedev and his successors to shift away from them. Second, it
suggests that dialogue on some of these most neuralgic issues may be
increasingly possible, regardless of what the Russian prime minister
thinks.

            And third - and this may be its most important role - his
article opens the way for a delinking of the Russia of today from the
Soviet Union of the past, something Putin has never been willing to do
but a step some Russian leader in the future will have to make if his
country is to be surrounded by anything other than enemies or those to
intimidated to be real friends.

 

Correction:  In my last mailing, from Thursday, March 26, I mistakenly
indicated that the first item Kyiv Post, "Friends Again, For Now" is an
editorial.  It is not.  OD

 

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