[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: FT; NYT; Politico; EDM (2)
Deychak, Orest
Orest.Deychak at mail.house.gov
Fri Nov 20 11:37:37 EST 2009
Financial Times
www.ft.com
Ukraine deal eases gas disruption fears
By Roman Olearchyk in Kiev
Published: November 20 2009
Vladimir Putin, Russian prime minister, has agreed to waive sanctions
against Ukraine and amend Russia's natural gas contract with the
country, in a move that could ease fears of a disruption to European gas
supplies this winter.
After late night talks held at the Crimean resort town of Yalta with
Yulia Tymoshenko, his Ukrainian counterpart, the Russian premier
reassured Europe that a repeat of last January's gas dispute between
Kiev and Moscow would be avoided.
His upbeat mood contrasted with repeated warnings by Russian officials
earlier this year that gas flow to Europe could be cut off should Kiev
fail to pay its gas bills on time.
"It would be very good to meet the New Year without any shocks," said Mr
Putin, adding that "there will be no sanctions" imposed on Ukraine for
consuming sharply less gas this year than originally agreed.
The multibillion-dollar penalties and gas import volumes had been set in
an agreement signed by both leaders last January in a bid to end a
two-week gas crisis.
Mr. Putin said on Thursday that Russia had agreed to increase gas
transit fees via Ukraine by some 60 per cent next year, a change that Ms
Tymoshenko said would raise billions of dollars for her country.
Thursday's agreement will boost Ms Tymoshenko's prospects in Ukraine's
hotly contested presidential election in January. Ms Tymoshenko, who
seeks to be seen as a pragmatic leader on friendly terms with Russia,
thanked Mr Putin saying: "You, as a strong country, are meeting us
halfway, taking into account the crisis conditions."
With her country's finances stretched to the limit, she conceded that
Kiev found it "difficult" to pay its multibillion-dollar gas bills to
Russia this year. But she pledged that Ukraine, whose pipeline system
pumps the majority of Russia's exports to Europe, would keep up its
payments to Russia's gas giant Gazprom.
Anders Aslund, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics, said the risk of further disruption of gas
supplies to Europe now looked small: "The only relevant party that may
have an interest in a new Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict is
[presidential incumbent Victor] Yushchenko, who is toying with the
tactic 'the worse the better', hoping to undermine Tymoshenko.
"Russia and Gazprom should have the greatest interest in avoiding it, as
Gazprom might lose out altogether on the European gas market if it cuts
supplies once again. Ukraine would lose credibility as transit country."
Earlier on Thursday, Kremlin officials had accused Mr Yushchenko of
"blackmailing" Europe by pushing to revise the natural gas supply
agreements reached last January between Mr Putin and Ms Tymoshenko.
With his popularity at single digit percentage levels, Mr Yushchenko is
not expected to be re-elected. But Ms Tymoshenko has accused him of
trying to starve her government of cash and sabotage energy relations
with Russia in order to undermine her presidential bid.
She is one of two presidential frontrunners openly pushing to revive
relations with Russia. The other is Viktor Yanukovich, the Moscow-backed
candidate in Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections.
Relations with Russia soured under Mr Yushchenko, who pushed hard for
Kiev to break free from Russia's orbit by seeking membership in the
European Union and Nato alliance.
Mr Medvedev last summer publicly accused him of pursuing anti-Russian
policies. Some Ukrainian political observers see Moscow's call for
Ukraine's next leader to be friendly, and the increasingly warm ties
with Tymoshenko, as blatant interference in domestic politics.
The New York Times
www.nytimes.com
In Ukraine, '04 Euphoria Has Turned To Despair
By ELLEN BARRY
19 November 2009
Late Edition - Final
6
LVIV, Ukraine -- It is not immediately clear why Vasily V. Humenyuk
should be a candidate for president of Ukraine. A former customs
official from the western city of Ivano-Frankivsk, he subscribes to no
particular ideology, has the flimsiest of platforms and does not plan to
tour the country before the vote, reasoning that ''these trips cost a
great deal and the people are sick of them.''
In fact, he could have vanished into this winter's overpopulated
presidential race had he not, on Oct. 2, legally changed his last name
to ''Protyvsikh,'' Ukrainian for ''Against Everyone.''
Though few see Mr. Protyvsikh as a serious candidate, he reflects the
sour mood that has swelled in the electorate -- and one that could swing
a pivotal presidential election in January.
For years, the vote in Ukraine has been almost evenly divided between
the industrial Russian-speaking east of the country, whose voters
generally favor closer ties with Moscow, and westerners intent on
pursuing a European path. The current field of 18 candidates is almost
certain to narrow for a closely fought second round of voting between
these two constituencies, in the form of former Prime Minister Viktor F.
Yanukovich, from the east, and the current prime minister, Yulia V.
Tymoshenko.
But while Mr. Yanukovich's voters have the incentive of reclaiming Kiev,
deep disillusionment has settled in the west, home of the Orange
Revolution. It is not yet clear whether that feeling runs so deep that
voters will stay home, or -- as Mr. Protyvsikh clearly hopes -- go out
of their way to cast a protest vote.
''Everyone's disappointed in politicians,'' said Vladimir Zuyenko, 44, a
security guard who said he had gone three months without pay. ''They
made this revolution, but they didn't solve anything. We were poor then,
and we're still poor. The only reason to vote is that if we don't,
someone else will vote for us.''
Five years ago, euphoria surged through this city, the first in Ukraine
to declare Viktor A. Yushchenko president, on the eve of the Orange
Revolution. So many people piled onto buses headed for Kiev to support
the pro-Western coalition that streets were left half-empty, and those
who stayed wore bits of orange in solidarity. Viktoria Gnip, 35, said
she was so inspired that she vowed on the spot to name her unborn baby
Yulia or Viktor, after the two heroes of the day.
Even recalling that happiness seems painful in Lviv (pronounced
luh-VEEV) these days. Voters complain about the bitter public infighting
between Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko, about cronyism in local
appointments, about an underfinanced health care system and about an
economy so miserable that doctors and teachers leave for menial jobs in
western Europe.
''People had hope then,'' Darya Lobachevskaya, 63, said. ''It lasted for
a year, maybe two years. But then, wherever it came from, it went back
there.''
As this mood has deepened, the proportion of Ukrainians who tell
pollsters they will vote for ''none of the above'' -- one option on the
ballot -- has been edging up, from 4 percent in 2004 to around 8 percent
now, said Oleksiy Antypovych, of the polling organization Rating, who
works out of Kiev and Lviv. By the time voters go to the polls, that
percentage drops by one-half, so it has never proved decisive in an
election, he said.
But the ''none of the above'' votes are much higher when respondents are
asked about the second round of this winter's election, with 18 percent
answering that they would not vote for either Mr. Yanukovich or Ms.
Tymoshenko. Even if half of that group ends up staying home or making a
choice between the candidates, up to 10 percent of Ukrainians may vote
for ''none of the above,'' Mr. Antypovych said.
''That would set a precedent,'' he said.
The protest vote, in this case, could be decisive. Current data shows
that 40 percent of voters would back Mr. Yanukovich in a second round,
and 30 percent would back Ms. Tymoshenko, Mr. Antypovych said. Though
Ms. Tymoshenko is likely to pick up many Orange votes from four
first-round candidates with similar platforms -- among them Mr.
Yushchenko -- it is not yet clear if the old coalition will rally around
her when she most needs it. Or what will happen if the results are
disputed.
''One thing I can say with certainty: There will be no repetition of
that revolution,'' Mr. Antypovych said. ''People will no longer go out
into the streets for a politician. They simply will not go out. Based on
our surveys, most voters expect there to be mass falsification. They are
already accustomed to the idea.''
It was against this backdrop that Mr. Protyvsikh, 63, began his quixotic
campaign.
In his handful of public appearances, he has stuck closely to his simple
slogan, explaining that he does not subscribe to any particular ideology
(''Elect me, and then I'll explain everything,'' he added,
reassuringly). Amid speculation that he was injected into the race to
sabotage another candidate, he said his financing came from ''my
friends, who are scattered all over the world, rich ones, my relatives,
my fellow villagers.''
Mostly, he answers questions about his last name. ''I made this decision
six months ago, because I had reached the end of my patience,'' he said
in a telephone interview. ''I will stand in the breach. I am brave, I am
independent. I changed my name to express the will of all the people --
many, many in Ukraine -- who are against everyone.''
Andrei Mikitin, a journalist from Mr. Protyvsikh's home town of
Ivano-Frankivsk, said the ''Against Everyone'' campaign has provoked
mostly chuckles at home. When push comes to shove, he said, however
disappointed western Ukrainians are in the Orange leadership, they will
be roused by the desire to vote against Mr. Yanukovich, if only because
Moscow backs him.
''You have to understand people here,'' said Mr. Mikitin, editor in
chief of the newspaper Western Ukraine. ''People don't need 'Against
Everyone.' They need an 'Against Russia.' Or an 'Against Putin.' That's
what I would have advised him, if he had asked me.''
Politico
Obama consultants land abroad
By: Kenneth P. Vogel and Ben Smith
November 18, 2009
In Kiev and Kharkiv and other cities in Ukraine, American political
consultants who worked against one another in Iowa and New Hampshire and
then in the general election are facing off again in a somewhat surreal
Eastern European replay of the 2008 campaign.
The firm headed by Hillary Clinton's former chief strategist, Mark Penn,
is helping run incumbent President Victor Yushchenko's campaign.
Meanwhile Paul Manafort, whose firm worked on Republican John McCain's
losing effort, and Tad Devine, a top strategist on the Democratic
presidential campaigns of Al Gore in 2000 and John Kerry in 2004, are
consulting for Victor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian frontrunner in the
polls.
For Penn, Manafort and Devine, foreign elections have been a lucrative
source of business for years. But for the Chicago-based media consulting
firm AKPD, the contract to help guide Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's
campaign is part of a new, growth area of business that presented itself
after the firm helped Barack Obama win the White House last fall.
Also assisting Tymoshenko is John Anzalone, a pollster who worked on the
Obama campaign. And Obama's lead pollster in the campaign, Joel
Benenson, also worked briefly in Ukraine this year, helping supporters
of a rival presidential candidate, former Parliament speaker Arseniy
Yatsenyuk, who courted comparisons with Obama (and whose billboards bear
a faint resemblance to the iconic posters of Obama by Shepard Fairey).
...
Full article: www.politico.com/news/stories/1109/29410.html
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Ukrainian Presidential Candidate Arseniy Yatseniuk's Foreign Policy
November 20, 2009
In 2008-2009 Arseniy Yatseniuk grew rapidly in popularity and was seen
as the rising star of a "new generation of Ukrainian politicians," with
some even touting him as "Ukraine's Obama" who would inevitably prove
"pro-Western." Evidence of Yatseniuk's pro-Western stance was seen when
he promoted Ukraine's trans-Atlantic integration as foreign minister in
2007-2008, his election in the first five candidates of the pro-Western
Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense bloc in the 2007 elections and his
signature (together with President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko) on a January 2008 letter to NATO requesting a
Membership Action Plan for Ukraine.
These assumptions about Yatseniuk were not based on his statements or
election program, which was only released in October
(www.frontzmin.org). Yatseniuk's foreign policy shift away from Brussels
and Moscow is described by Ukrainian experts as "isolationist" or a
nationalist third-way.
In June 2009, Yatseniuk's main financial sponsor -oligarch Viktor
Pinchuk- pressured him to exchange Ukrainian for Russian political
technologists: Timofei Sergeitsev, Dmitry Kulikov and Iskander Valitov
(www.proua.com, July 3; Ukrayinska Pravda, July 21-22). These political
technologists had a poor reputation -they had not only worked in Viktor
Yanukovych's 2004 dirty election campaign, but also belonged to the
State Duma Expert Council controlled by the Ukrainophobe Konstantin
Zatulin who is banned from entering Ukraine.
Russian political technologists moved Yatseniuk away from his
pro-Western orientation to a Ukrainian "third way,"
isolationist-nationalist platform. In an interview in Korrespondent
(July 31), Yatseniuk praised the former Russian President Vladimir Putin
for bringing order to Russia. When asked if he wanted to be a "Ukrainian
Putin" he replied that he planned to be neither a "Putin" nor an
"Obama," indicating the isolationist-nationalism position he was
adopting. Yatseniuk has also used the global economic crisis to become a
critic of liberalism (wwwfrontzmin.org).
Since last summer Yatseniuk has abandoned the pro-NATO position that he
held in 2007-2008. In a lengthy interview in Komsomolskaya Pravda v
Ukraini (July 31-August 6), Yatseniuk stated his now often repeated
phrase that Ukraine is not being invited into NATO or the E.U. and,
therefore, membership in both organizations is currently not an issue
for the country. Yatseniuk's election program, speeches and statements
call for a new "Eastern European union" of countries not given a
membership option by the E.U. which he defines as "Greater Europe"
(Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraini, September 28).
One of the first public discussions of Yatseniuk's
isolationist-nationalism took place at the annual Yalta European
Strategy (YES) summit on September 25-26. YES, a pro-E.U. lobbying NGO
funded by Pinchuk gave the floor to the three main presidential
candidates -Tymoshenko, Yatseniuk and Yanukovych- in a live broadcast on
ICTV, one of four television channels owned by Pinchuk. Yatseniuk's
speech at the YES summit confused Ukrainian and foreign guests with
voters watching ICTV unclear as to what he really stood for, and if he
supported or opposed Ukraine's membership of the E.U. (NATO was not even
raised). "Nobody to the very end understood what Yatseniuk meant when he
spoke of Greater Europe," Glavred editor and Yatseniuk sympathizer
Alyona Getmanchuk observed on September 28. Yatseniuk could not answer
repeated questions as to what ideological niche he represented
(www.glavred.info, September 28).
Ukrainian media analysis following the YES summit was uniformly
critical, stating that he was a different man the year before, when he
was described as the "most progressive pro-European" Ukrainian
politician (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 28). Yatseniuk's speech shocked
guests for the "aggressiveness" of its "message" (www.glavred.info,
September 28). Yatseniuk's Greater Europe is an alternative to Western
and Russian integrationist projects and would unite Ukraine, Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan in a new union with its center in Kyiv. Greater
Europe would focus on four joint projects in energy, transport and
communications, industry and access to world markets and the
military-industrial complex (Yatseniuk's "New Course" election program,
www.frontzmin.org).
In Yatseniuk's "Ukrainian Interests" (Interfax-Ukraine, September 28) he
explained the roots of his Greater Europe idea as lying in the most
"powerful geopolitical project in the history of mankind -Kyiv Rus"
(Ukrayinsky Tyzhden, October 16). Yatseniuk stressed the role of Kyiv as
the ideological center of eastern Pan Slavism, Eastern European Orthodox
civilization and the ideological kernel of the Russian empire. Kyiv
should, Yatseniuk believes, be revived as the center of a new
geopolitical project and "Eastern European empire with its center in
Kyiv" (Komentarii, October 16). "Ukraine can and should become the
initiator of a new Eastern European union that I see from Uzhorod to
Vladivostok. And Kyiv will be its center," he asserted (Komentarii,
October 16).
As Ukrainian experts noted, Yatseniuk has "borrowed" the ideas of
Ukrainian right and left-wing populist-nationalists who propagated the
theme of "away from Moscow and the West" in the 1990's. In 1993 Dmytro
Korchynsky, the then leader of the extreme right-wing Ukrainian National
Assembly (UNA), said: "Our people have become used to living in a big
state. We will make Ukraine into a large state so that the people will
have no need to change their habits" (Komentarii, October 16). UNA's
fusion of pan-Slavism and Ukrainian nationalism came one year after its
paramilitary People's Self Defense Forces (UNSO) fought in the
Trans-Dniestr conflict on the side of separatists. Korchynsky is now
head of Bratstvo, a member of the Eurasian Youth Movement.
Left-wing Ukrainian left-wing populist-nationalism was popularized by
two Prime Ministers in 1995-1997: Yevhen Marchuk and Pavlo Lazarenko.
This translated into political support in the in the 1998 elections in
the Social Democratic united and Hromada parties respectively.
Yatseniuk's Greater Europe is also similar to the 2003 CIS Single
Economic Space that unites the same four countries with Kyiv replacing
Minsk as its center.
In 2008 Yatseniuk was seen as the new face of Ukrainian politics
supporting a pro-Western foreign policy; but, this was before Ukrainians
and Westerners had seen his program. Since last summer, his election
program has positioned Yatseniuk as the candidate supporting an
isolationist-nationalist third way, without deference to either Moscow
or Brussels and Washington.
--Taras Kuzio
November 18, 2009
Ukraine Relying on IMF Payments for Russian Gas Purchase
Ukraine finds it increasingly difficult to survive without money from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The country paid Russia for
October's gas deliveries with IMF funds and the same means will be used
for November's gas deliveries. However, the IMF did not disburse the
fourth $3.8-billion tranche of its $16.4-billion loan to Ukraine in
mid-November because of the government's populist policies (EDM,
November 4). This means that Ukraine may not receive more IMF money
until after the presidential elections in January and February, and
consequently it is unclear where it will find the money to pay for
Russian gas in early 2010. The debt-ridden Naftohaz Ukrainy state-run
oil and gas behemoth ran out of money long ago. There are fears that the
situation in early 2009, when gas deliveries to Europe via Ukraine were
stopped for two weeks over a pricing dispute between Russia and Ukraine,
may be repeated.
It was feared that Ukraine would be unable to pay even for October and
the head of the European Commission (E.C.) -the European Union's
executive arm- Jose Barroso telephoned President Viktor Yushchenko and
urged him to pay for the gas. Fearing that Ukraine's failure to pay for
the gas could affect gas transit to the E.U., Barroso said in clear
terms that European consumers should not suffer because of Ukraine.
Yushchenko assured Barroso that Ukraine would pay from the $2 billion
that it received in accordance with its share in the IMF in August and
September as a result of a one-off distribution of the IMF's funds
(UNIAN, November 5). Ukraine transferred to Gazprom $480 million from
the IMF money on November 6, several hours before the deadline for
payment (Channel 5, November 6).
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Hryhory Nemyrya admitted in his November
9 interview to Channel 5 that Ukraine may find it difficult to pay for
December's Russian gas deliveries in early January 2010 if the IMF does
not release the fourth tranche in 2009. Nemyrya said he feared a
repetition of the January 2009 crisis. He stated that Kyiv will most
likely use the IMF's funds received in September in early December to
pay for November deliveries, but he admitted that it is uncertain how
Ukraine would pay in January. President Yushchenko's aide Oleksandr
Shlapak shared Nemyrya's view point. Also speaking to Channel 5, he said
that Ukraine cannot pay for gas in December and January without the
IMF's assistance.
While admitting that the payment to Gazprom due in early January may be
delayed, Yushchenko's administration pretends that it does not see any
link between this and transit to Europe. This means that Ukraine will
blame Russia for any transit disruptions again, like in January 2009
when gas bound for transit was used by Ukrainian consumers after Russian
deliveries were halted. Yushchenko's energy aide Bohdan Sokolovsky
dismissed Moscow's warnings that transit to the E.U. may be disrupted
because Ukraine has no funds to pay for gas. He said Ukraine had
accumulated enough gas in underground storage facilities to last over
winter and its gas transit network is fully operational. He also warned
that Naftohaz faces fines of up to $8 billion for buying less gas in
2009 than stipulated by contracts with Gazprom (Interfax-Ukraine,
November 9).
The fines, added to a $4-billion hole in Naftohaz's 2009 budget
according to Yushchenko's estimates (Ukrainska Pravda, November 12),
would bankrupt Naftohaz. However, Yushchenko may be exaggerating
Naftohaz's problems as Kommersant-Ukraine reported on November 11,
citing documents of the Ukraine-Russia commission for fuel and energy,
that the fines should not exceed $1.8 billion. Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko flatly dismissed Yushchenko's warnings about such fines. She
reiterated that Russia would not fine Naftohaz and she recalled that
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had "firmly promised" this. Putin
has "not once let us down whenever we agreed on something," she noted
(Interfax-Ukraine, November 14). Gazprom Deputy CEO Aleksandr Medvedev
confirmed that Gazprom would not fine Naftohaz because of the difficult
financial situation in Ukraine. Nonetheless, he noted that Gazprom
formally retains the right to fine Naftohaz (UNIAN, November 15).
Naftohaz may face fines not only from Gazprom, but also from
RosUkrEnergo, a joint venture between Gazprom and businessman Dmytro
Fitash which was banished from the Ukrainian market in January 2009.
RosUkrEnergo's 11 billion cubic meters of gas, which had been kept in
Ukraine's underground storage, became Ukrainian property in early 2009
according to agreements between Gazprom and Naftohaz. RosUkrEnergo sued
Naftohaz for $8.26 billion in damages (Vedomosti, November 16).
Tymoshenko will discuss gas issues with Putin at the CIS summit in
Crimea on November 19. Irrespective of the outcome of their talks, it is
clear that only the continuation of cooperation with the IMF will enable
Ukraine to pay for gas. "But without fruitful cooperation between
Ukraine and the IMF, it would have been impossible to live through this
year," Tymoshenko admitted in her recent meeting with foreign
ambassadors (Ukrainska Pravda, November 11). In order to receive the
fourth tranche, the cabinet will have to revise its unrealistic 2010
budget bill, and increase domestic gas prices to ease pressure on
Naftohaz's budget while parliament and Yushchenko avoid increasing wages
and pensions beyond the limits agreed with the IMF.
--Pavel Korduban
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