[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: HC hearing; FT; KP; EDM; OSCE

[Deychak, Orest]

U.S. Helsinki Commission hearing “Advancing U.S. Interests in the OSCE Region" 

October 28, 2009

 

Witnesses:  Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

 

For full hearing transcript:  www.csce.gov

 

Excerpts pertaining to Ukraine:

 

REP. SMITH:  

…The saber rattling towards Ukraine and Georgia seems to be growing.  There’s a crescendo there of animosity reflected in the newspapers.  It’s also coming out of the mouths of some of the politicians.  If you could speak to that as well because all of us are concerned about new eruptions, if you will, in South Ossetia especially. … 

 

MR. GORDON:  

…And we have concerns about Ukraine as well and some of the things that had been said recently there.  We have differences (i.e. with Russia – OD.)on NATO enlargement and one of the core principles of European security that we think countries and democracies in Europe should have the right to join alliances of their choosing.  And we have differences on human rights, which I already alluded to that the president and the secretary both made very clear in Moscow.  

 

MR. VERSHBOW:  If I could just follow on to what Secretary Gordon just said in response to the question about saber rattling by the Russians.  I think that this is an area of concern that we watch very carefully.  I was just in Ukraine about three weeks ago and in Georgia last week.  And one of my purposes was to reassure those two countries, who are feeling a little nervous, that we do stand by them and we support their sovereignty and territorial integrity.  I think part of our common work between the Defense Department and the State Department is to try to help these countries strengthen their own institutions, their political institutions, their economies, which is a key part to their becoming more self reliant and able to strengthen their own security.

 

We also support their legitimate right to self defense and to choose their security alliances.  We pledged to assist them and as they pursue their NATO aspirations.  This is a process that’s going to take some years.  They have a lot of work to do, but it’s something that as a matter of principle we stand by them on.  

 

The focus of my visits was on strengthening our bilateral defense relations and working on bilateral defense cooperation, helping with their defense reforms.  And there too, I think we sometimes are criticized by the Russians, but as a matter of principle, these are sovereign countries that deserve our support and we’re very transparent about it.  

 

I think we also do raise these issues, as Phil Gordon just said, in our dialogue with Russia.  And I think that as we try to reset our relations with Russia and create more of a mutual stake and cooperation, hopefully it will give the Russians incentives to manage their differences with countries like Ukraine and Georgia, rather than to exacerbate existing tensions.  

 

And I think there are means within the OSCE process where we can help as well.  Part of the focus of our efforts in the Corfu process is to strengthen all countries’ commitment to those very fundamental Helsinki principles, starting with things like sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect for the independence of all states and for their existing borders.  

 

We, I think, recognize that we could do better in our conflict prevention efforts and if we can find better mechanisms to prevent crises as occurred in Georgia from happening again, we should certainly do that.  More transparency about military activities, confidence building measures, these are all things that we will pursue to try to contribute to a de-escalation of tensions.  

 

And I think encouraging Russia and its neighbors to work together on common security projects, which is another area where the OSCE can be useful, things like border security, fighting narcotics trafficking, dealing with nonproliferation issues, this also can give them a mutual stake in cooperative relations that can provide longer term solutions to these problems.  

 

SEN. CARDIN:  Sen. Brownback?  

 

SEN. BROWNBACK:  Thanks, Mr. Chairman.  Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your work.  

 

Sec. Vershbow, just following up on that about Georgia and the Ukraine, is there – what timeframe are you looking at to see their joining NATO because that, as a tangible think, I would think that would be one of the most tangible that we could stand for and push for aggressively and quickly to stand against the saber rattling by the Russians.  

 

MR. VERSHBOW:  Well, I think it’s very hard to come up with a timetable at this point.  I mean, NATO has taken a very important decision at its Bucharest summit last year in stating that these two countries will be members of NATO.  And there are now mechanisms that NATO has established by which both countries have to demonstrate that they are able to meet NATO standards.

 

So in part, this is up to them – whether they are prepared to put their shoulder to the wheel and do the necessary preparations, which involves not just military things but strengthening democratic institutions. 

 

SEN. BROWNBACK:  But you could help them with the military things:  administration –

 

MR. VERSHBOW:  We certainly – in a responsible way because we’re trying to maintain stability as we go forward and we’re very transparent about our defense relations.  But we do stand ready to be their mentor in this process.  Even though NATO itself has the mechanisms by which they pursue their aspirations.

 

SEN. BROWNBACK:  So what timeframe are you –

 

MR. VERSHBOW:  I think we’re talking about a matter of years.  But I wouldn’t want to put a number on it because a lot depends on the efforts of Ukraine and Georgia.  And also, at the end of the day, there has to be a political decision based on consensus by all the members of NATO as to when they could be admitted.

 

SEN. BROWNBACK:  But you would agree the sooner the better?  And you’re going to be pushing for that?  The administration will?

 

MR. VERSHBOW:  We believe that we should stand by the decisions NATO has made and assist these countries moving as quickly as they’re prepared to go.  And then NATO will have to make its decision at the appropriate time.

 

SEN. BROWNBACK:  Well, as I understand – I had a Ukrainian official in my office yesterday – they’re prepared to go right now, very quickly.  And I really think some strong prodding by the administration and then tangible support would be a key thing in standing up in this pretty aggressive Russian atmosphere right now towards both of those countries.

 

MR. VERSHBOW:  I think in the case of Ukraine – and this is a subject of my defense consultations when I was there a few weeks ago – they have a lot of work to do to stay on track for meeting the NATO standards.  So their defense budget has declined precipitously.  They’ve missed opportunities this past year to participate in Partnership for Peace exercises because their parliament couldn’t pass the necessary legislation.  So there are issues on the home front that Ukraine has to tend to which may be easier to address after their elections early next year.

 

But ultimately, the pace is really more for the candidate members to determine rather than for us.  But we, as I said, are openly ready to advise them and assist them.  We have FMF for both countries.  We have other defense cooperative activities.  So we will do our part but they have the lion’s share of the work to do themselves….

 

Financial Times

IMF warns Ukraine on aid freeze amid fears for stability

By Roman Olearchyk in Kiev 

Published: October 26 2009 

The International Monetary Fund warned Ukraine yesterday that it might freeze assistance ahead of January's hotly contested presidential election if populist wage and pension increases are introduced.

The warning comes as fears grow that Ukraine could sink deeper into political turmoil, following in the footsteps of other eastern European countries - most recently Romania - where governments have collapsed amid the economic downturn.

In a statement issued after talks with Ukrainian officials, the IMF said its decision to issue an additional $3.8bn (€2.5bn, £2.3bn) in aid would hang on "assurances that the wage and pension law approved by Ukraine's parliament, which is at odds with the objectives of the authorities' programme, will be vetoed".

The statement was a clear signal to President Viktor Yushchenko, who has not yet clarified whether he will sign or veto the law.

Ukraine needs the aid to service a budget deficit and keep the country stable.

The law envisions some $1bn in wage and pension increases ahead of the January 2010 election, and nearly $10bn next year.

The move would increase Ukraine's budget deficit from 6 to 8 per cent.

With gross domestic product plunging 18 per cent in the first half of 2009, and finances stretched to the limit, Ukraine's government has stayed afloat thanks to nearly $11bn in IMF aid. Officials say the economy is starting to emerge from a deep recession, but insist they do not have funds for additional expenditure.

The IMF said: "The economic and financial situation in Ukraine is stabilising as a result of fund assistance and policies. Preserving these gains will require policy discipline and corrective actions in some areas."

Mr Yushchenko, whose popular support has sunk to single-digit levels, is not expected to be re-elected. He and other presidential candidates have, however, accused the IMF of being too soft on the government of his rival Yulia Tymoshenko. They have suggested the IMF could be supporting Ms Tymoshenko's presidential bid by providing financial assistance in spite of the adoption of unpopular reforms.

The IMF has denied such allegations. Observers say reforms have stalled due to constant political bickering.

The presidential race, which formally kicked off last week, is considered by many to be wide open. But the two frontrunners are Ms Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych, the former prime minister and Russia-backed candidate in the 2004 presidential election.

Like Mr Yushchenko, Ms Tymoshenko is pro-western and supports Ukraine's bid to join the European Union. She has also positioned herself as a candidate who could harmonise relations with Russia, which soured under Mr Yushchenko's presidency.

www.ft.com/imf 


Kyiv Post


Political sabotage


Editorial 

October 29, 2009

By refusing to veto populist increase in wages approved by parliament, Victor Yushchenko puts at risk the country’s financial and economic stability. 

Millions of Ukrainians stood in freezing weather to protest election fraud and to support Victor Yushchenko’s candidacy during the 2004 democratic Orange Revolution. It was an admirable act of courage, but since then people have moved on to feel that their leader has betrayed them and many of the values they stood for.

Yushchenko ultimately deserves the blame for much of the political paralysis that has dominated during his tenure. As president, he has demonstrated a complete inability to put aside differences with rivals in favor of tough, pragmatic compromises which could have produced positive results for the country and citizens.

Tired of the relentless infighting, Ukrainians have long tuned out of politics, but polls show they are informed and wise enough to have rightfully lost trust in Yushchenko, who has failed as president to – among other heinous crimes – get his own poisoning case solved. Thus, it’s little surprise that polls put his popularity at about 3 percent.

This week, once again, Yushchenko demonstrated that personal dislikes and political selfishness shape his actions. In his most recent populist and destructive decision, Yushchenko chose to undercut his bitter rival, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, at the expense of the country’s economy and most vulnerable citizens.

By refusing to veto a populist wage and pension increase adopted by lawmakers last week, Yushchenko has put the prospect of further International Monetary Fund assistance at risk, which has for the last year helped to preserve the country’s economic and financial stability.

He ignored calls by the IMF and Tymoshenko’s government to veto the law, which violates cooperation agreements with the fund by proposing some $11 billion in additional budget expenditures in 2009-2010, which simply do not exist in state coffers.

This legislation was supported by lawmakers from most political blocs in parliament (Victor Yanukovych’s Regions, Volodymyr Lytvyn’s bloc, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and Communists). Notable exceptions were lawmakers backing Tymoshenko’s candidacy. The clear aim of Yushchenko and co-conspirators in this wicked plot is to derail IMF assistance ahead of the Jan. 17 presidential contest, thereby complicating the ability of Tymoshenko’s government to pay pensions and wages on time and in full.

Such a scenario could severely hurt her popularity. But it would also hurt the country badly, destabilizing the economy and fueling inflation.

That is something that a true president would not allow, at all costs


Jamestown Foundation blog on Russia and Eurasia


Thursday, October 29, 2009


Ukraine:  The Election Gets Organized and the IMF Gets Gone, by Tammy Lynch:  http://www.jamestown.org/blog <http://app.bronto.com/public/?q=ulink&fn=Link&ssid=500&id=f0erex3v34c1m89o5a7r1ia894w1e&id2=aexxpagn1aa2e2ueuit0ptl8fah3b&subscriber_id=aarycknzkaaenkciettblrfkgetsbab&delivery_id=aqxdevofjwcmiqujxogjfhaazecqblk> 

Eurasia Daily Monitor 

October 28, 2009

Poroshenko Starts to Mend Fences with Russia

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Petro Poroshenko visited Moscow on October 23. Appointed earlier this month, Poroshenko views rapprochement with Russia as one of his main goals, and he made a point of saying what Moscow wanted to hear during his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and in his comments afterwards. He could not offer anything specific though as it is unclear how Ukraine’s foreign policy will be transformed when President Viktor Yushchenko steps down next year. Although Poroshenko’s peacemaking intentions were appreciated in Moscow, he was not told anything specific. It is still not clear when a new Russian ambassador will arrive in Kyiv or whether President Dmitry Medvedev will meet Yushchenko.

Relations with Russia reached their nadir after the Georgian war last year. While Yushchenko voiced his unconditional support for Georgia, Moscow accused Kyiv of selling arms to Tbilisi and alleged that Ukrainians were spotted fighting on the Georgian side. The relations were further exacerbated by the harsh statements which Medvedev made this past August. He accused Yushchenko of intentionally spoiling bilateral relations and made it clear that a new Russian ambassador would not be sent to Kyiv until after the January 17, 2010 presidential election in Ukraine. Moscow refused to organize a meeting between Medvedev and Yushchenko at the CIS summit in Moldova earlier this month and Medvedev even tried to avoid shaking hands with Yushchenko at the summit (UNIAN, October 9).

Mutual recriminations continued ahead of Poroshenko’s visit. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin accused Yushchenko of violating the basic agreements on the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) base in Sevastopol by making border crossing rules more complicated for Russian ships and sailors (Izvestiya, October 22). Yushchenko, addressing the intelligentsia in Kharkiv, said that problems with Russia were unavoidable as “any country developing as a democracy will have problems in relations with a great empire.” Yushchenko noted that Russia has difficult relations with nearly all its neighbors (Interfax-Ukraine, October 22).

Against such a background, mending fences was not an easy task for Poroshenko. He attempted to circumvent problems as best as he could, by playing down the differences. Poroshenko told Lavrov that Yushchenko, parliament, the cabinet and the opposition were all interested in strategic partnership with Russia, so there was no need to “reset” bilateral relations. Poroshenko also declared that there was no urgency to revise the BSF agreements according to which the BSF is stationed in Sevastopol until 2017, and Lavrov agreed with him (Ukrainska Pravda, October 23). It is feared in Ukraine that the Russian navy will not leave Sevastopol after 2017, and the head of the Russian movement to support the navy, Mikhail Nenashev, confirmed after Poroshenko’s visit that Moscow will seek the prolongation of the BSF agreements (UNIAN, October 25). However, this problem will be left to a Ukrainian president elected in 2015 to solve, consequently Poroshenko apparently decided not to vex Russia.

Poroshenko also dismissed the possibility of stationing U.S. air defense systems in Ukraine. He said the United States has not officially raised this issue with Kyiv (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 26). Earlier, he had rejected the suggestion made by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow that U.S. early warning systems could be stationed in Ukraine (Segodnya, October 9). Poroshenko also said that the issue of joining NATO, a special concern for Moscow, was not on the Ukrainian agenda (Kommersant-Ukraine, October 26).

After meeting with Lavrov, Poroshenko downplayed both Ukraine’s role in the conflict with Georgia, saying that Ukrainians did not participate, and Medvedev’s accusations against Yushchenko of spoiling bilateral relations (Ekho Moskvy, October 23). He said that Lavrov had agreed that the mutual blacklists of unwanted visitors should be gradually scrapped (Interfax-Ukraine, October 23). This had been declared also by Poroshenko’s predecessors, though little has changed in this respect. Poroshenko himself had been blacklisted by the Russian authorities and denied entry to Russia in early 2007.

Despite his efforts to please Moscow, Poroshenko was not told when a new Russian ambassador would be sent to Kyiv to replace Viktor Chernomyrdin, or whether Medvedev would agree to meet Yushchenko to discuss bilateral problems face-to-face. “We declared the need to organize this meeting,” said Poroshenko. “Now the ball is in the Russian court.” Asked about the ambassador, Lavrov only said that the ambassador designate, Mikhail Zurabov, was “getting prepared for his departure to Kyiv.” He has kept saying this for months. Poroshenko admitted afterwards that a lack of trust was the main problem in bilateral relations (Kommersant-Ukraine, October 26).

Poroshenko can personally win trust in Russia as he apparently plays according to rules accepted in Moscow. The official newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta said on October 26 that Poroshenko pleasantly surprised many in Russia. The Russian charge d’affairs in Kyiv Vsevolod Loskutov, noted that Poroshenko’s visit was successful and constructive (Ukrainski Novyny, October 26). More progress is expected at a meeting between Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, which is scheduled for November 19 in Yalta, as the two have apparently managed to establish very good relations.

--Pavel Korduban

 


OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine


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Press release


OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine supports creation of mechanisms to prevent torture and ill-treatment in detention


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LVIV, Ukraine, 26 October, 2009 - An East European Conference that looks at challenges and practical aspects of implementing national mechanisms to prevent torture and ill-treatment in detention, co-hosted by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU), started today in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv.

The event focuses on the implementation of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the OSCE region, with a special emphasis on the role of civil society. The protocol calls for the creation of national mechanisms to prevent torture in places of detention.

"The OSCE strongly supports Ukraine's efforts to create and use an efficient national preventive mechanism, thereby strengthening democracy and the rule of law," said Ambassador Lubomir Kopaj, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator. "These values constitute the core of the OSCE commitments."

The OSCE PCU is organizing the conference jointly with the International Custody Visiting Association, the Kharkiv Institute for Social Research and the Open Society Institute.

Representatives from institutions dealing with human rights protection and torture prevention matters in Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Tajikistan and the United Kingdom are taking part in the event.

Participants from Ukraine include officials from the Parliamentary Ombudsman's Office, the National Security and Defence Council, several government ministries, the National Academy of the Prosecutor's Office, as well as regional co-ordinators from mobile monitoring groups - which, with the support of the OSCE PCU, make regular inspection visits to detention facilities.


During the meeting, the OSCE PCU will share lessons from its three-year experience of supporting Ukraine's Interior Ministry in establishing a system of civil monitoring in detention facilities across the country. Such monitoring is part of the creation of the national mechanisms to prevent torture and ill-treatment.

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