[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: Note; WoE; EDM

[Deychak, Orest]

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*         The following article is well worth reading.  While one can
take issue with some of Yakovenko's quotes (e.g. his reference to "one
language"; perhaps his characterization of Tymoshenko), its core themes
are right on the mark.  OD 

 

Window on Eurasia: Ukraine is Escaping the Past but Russia is Not,
Moscow Analyst Says

 

Paul Goble

 

            Vienna, September 9 - In what matters most - a national
self-definition that recognizes the futility of zero-sum politics in the
modern world - Ukraine, with all its problems, nonetheless has achieved
far more over the last 18 years than Russia over the same period despite
or more precisely because of the bombast the latter displays continues
to display

            Consequently, Igor Yakovenko argued in "Yezhednevny zhurnal"
last week, Ukraine has a far better chance both to develop as a modern
nation and to integrate into Europe than does Russia, which despite its
apparent advantages, remains mired in the imperial past and is unlikely
to do either (ej.ru/?a=note_print&id=9407). 

            As the two countries mark their respective 18th birthdays,
Yakovenko says, many in both of these post-Soviet lands and elsewhere
focus on their commonalities, including corruption, the mixing of
business and government, alcoholism and health problems, and the many
other characteristics shared by most post-Soviet states.

            But the differences between Russia and Ukraine are not only
striking but critical for the current and future direction of the two:
Ukraine has elections, while Russia does not. Ukraine has a relatively
free media, while Russia does not. And Ukraine's militia and security
services are not out of control, while Russia's in many respects very
much are. 

            And it is because of these differences and the sense that
Ukraine might achieve something Russia is unlikely to that "Ukraine as
the Anti-Russia is gradually driving out the US in the Manichean picture
of the world" in the Kremlin."  This is not just because talking about
the US as the Anti-Russia is "comic" given Russia's inability to "catch
up to Portugal."

            Statements by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, much
covered in Russia and the West, have drawn attention to Ukraine's
problems, but they reflect Russia's own as well.  There are good reasons
for "skepticism" concerning the ability of Ukraine to reach full
maturity as a country, but there are even more good reasons for
skepticism about Russia's chances.

            While some polls do suggest that many Ukrainians who voted
for independence in 1991 would not do so again if given the chance,
other polls show that "the overwhelming majority of residents of Ukraine
do not want reunification with Russia" in any of the various forms some
have proposed. 

            If reunification is not in prospect, a turn toward
authoritarianism is not yet off the table in Ukraine. If Yulia
Timoshenko were to become president, "her moral relativism in politics
and definite demagogy," Yakovenko says, could "destroy those extremely
weak growths of European values which are barely noted in Ukraine but
which give it a chance to become a normal country.

            But even if Timoshenko does win, her rule would be "much
less harsh than for example Putinism in Russia."  It would be
"authoritarianism-lite."  And "the 'Putin in skirts' is someone Ukraine
would not tolerate, and if it would allow it at all, Yakovenko
continues, then this would not be for very long."

            "The heterogeneous quality of [Ukraine] both geographically
and in terms of political clans will inevitably give birth to political
and media pluralism. In Ukraine, it is impossible to create an analogue
to the United Russia Party and to freeze the mass media according to the
Russian model."

            All this shows, the Moscow commentator insists, that
"Ukraine is already different.  It, of course, is not Anti-Russia.  It
is Not-Russia.  This is the result of its separate coming of age." And
its prospects for the future are far better, if not completely certain,
than are those likely for Russia itself. 

            Ukraine's "single real" chance to complete its national
project is "integration into Europe." That "goal is not near and the
chances of its realization are not 100 percent, but they are far from
zero."  And that is impressive if one considers the situation in the
other 11 former Soviet republics and especially of the Russian
Federation. 

            Russia remains trapped in the grip of a desire to build "a
new empire," but "the chances for the realization of this project are
not simply small.  They are equal to zero. They do not exist."  Russia
could play a role if it was willing to accept the status of a junior
partner to the US, Europe or China, but Russians are not prepared to do
this. 

            They are not prepared to give up their "messianic goals" or
to recognize that Europe has moved beyond zero-sum politics, in which
there are clear winners and losers, into a system in which all
participants must take away something positive. Russians remain
convinced that any victory for them requires a defeat for others, and
vice versa. 

            Moscow has "bought Schroeder, made friends with Berlusconi,
purchased wholesale and retail experts and politicians in Eastern
Europe, Western Europe and the United States."  But this has not brought
Russia happiness, because Russia is not in a position to achieve its
messianic goal of a new empire.

            This then, Yakovenko argues, is "the main distinction of
Russia and Ukraine."  Russia continues to think that it is an empire, to
celebrate its size and power as the main things. But Ukraine is rapidly
moving toward an acceptance of the reality that it is a second-tier
country that must cooperate with others in a European fashion in order
to survive and flourish. 

             On the basis of this comparison, the Moscow writer offers
three conclusions.  First, he says, Russia and Ukraine have "met their
18th birthdays not as adults but more as difficult youths who have not
yet succeeded in dealing with their complexes.  Second, the trajectories
of the two countries and their peoples are ever more different.

            And third - and this may prove especially hard for many
Russians to accept - "people speaking one language and having a culture
which is largely in common are becoming hostages of politicians who have
not proved capable of rising to the extent of the tasks which the times
put before them." 

 

Eurasia Daily Monitor 

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/

September 9, 2009

Yanukovych and Tymoshenko Courting Moscow Ahead of Election

The Russian factor might well determine the outcome of the January 2010
presidential election in Ukraine. The two leaders in the presidential
race, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and former Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych, both seek Moscow's support. Yanukovych has played the
Russian language card in order to win the hearts and minds of the
Russophones in the east and south of Ukraine. Tymoshenko is more
pragmatic, seeking rather economic favors and taking advantage of the
good relationship that she has established with Russian Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin.

Speaking recently in Odessa, where Russian culture and language
dominate, Yanukovych pledged to do his utmost to make Russian the second
official language along with Ukrainian. This, he pointed out, is one of
his major policy differences with Tymoshenko, who is against granting
Russian a higher status (UNIAN, September 2). Yanukovych also promised
the same to his Russian-speaking electorate in the run-up to the 2004
presidential election, which he lost to Viktor Yushchenko who ran on a
nationalist ticket. However, many local Russian speakers recall that
Yanukovych did nothing to elevate the status of Russian in 2006-2007,
when he was prime minister and his Party of Regions dominated
parliament.

After visiting Odessa, Yanukovych traveled to Saur-Mogila, a World War
II memorial in his native Donetsk Region, where he promised to erect a
monument to the Soviet liberators at the geographical point where the
borders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus converge. He made it clear that
this would be his response to the "heroization of the traitors of
Ukraine and nationalists" by Yushchenko (Ukrainska Pravda, September 5).
Yanukovych has never concealed that he shares the Russian official view
on the common history of Ukraine and Russia. He had hailed Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev's August 11 letter to Yushchenko in which he
accused his counterpart of spoiling bilateral relations, in particular
of "heroizing Nazi collaborators." Medvedev also blamed Yushchenko for
pushing Russian from various spheres of life (www.kremlin.ru, August
11).

Yanukovych also called for restoring "the traditional strategic
brotherhood with Russia." "I am sure that the centuries-long traditions
of friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian nations will be
continued," he said. Yanukovych reiterated that he would do his best to
elevate the status of Russian so that the rights of Russian speakers
will not be violated (Ukrainska Pravda, September 5). Such
pronouncements, which were unexpected from Yushchenko and which
Tymoshenko avoids, are consistent with the pan-Slavonic ideology that
dominates in the Kremlin.

Tymoshenko, whose mostly nationally-minded electorate would not forgive
her such statements, courts Russia differently and she has already
secured favors. She persuaded Putin to allow Ukraine to buy less natural
gas than stipulated in the January 2009 contracts between Naftohaz
Ukrainy and Gazprom. After meeting with her in Poland on September 1,
Putin agreed that Ukraine will pay in 2009 for as much gas as it
consumes. The contracts contained a clause according to which Ukraine
had to pay for at least 41 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2009, no
matter whether it needed such quantities. Putin confirmed that Russia
will proceed from the understanding that "the Ukrainian economy consumes
as much energy today as it needs." It may need as little as 27 bcm,
according to Tymoshenko (Interfax-Ukraine, September 1).

Yushchenko estimated that Russia could penalize Ukraine for as much as
$5 billion for the difference. He warned that Ukraine might pay by
losing economic and political independence (Inter TV, September 6). Many
observers in both Russia and Ukraine wonder what was behind Putin's
generosity. Kommersant-Ukraine daily reported on September 2 that
Tymoshenko made several commercial offers to Putin in exchange for the
Russian agreement not to penalize Ukraine. According to the daily,
Tymoshenko offered Putin discounts on gas transit fees, support for
Russian banks' expansion into the Ukrainian market and some preferences
concerning the participation of Russian companies in Ukrainian
privatization. Also Kommersant-Ukraine cited Tymoshenko's aide Oleksandr
Hudyma as saying that Ukraine will probably prefer Russia's TVEL to the
U.S. Westinghouse as partners in building a nuclear fuel plant.

Tymoshenko denied this, saying that Ukraine will on the contrary charge
65-75 percent more for Russian gas transit to Europe in 2010
(Kommersant-Ukraine, September 4). However, Medvedev apparently
disagreed with this and other statements made by Putin and Tymoshenko in
Poland. He instructed Gazprom head Aleksey Miller not to deviate from
the January 2009 gas agreements, which provide for both transit fees
lower than those promised by Tymoshenko and penalties for Ukraine's
failure to buy less gas than agreed (RIA Novosti, September 7).
Segodnya, a Ukrainian daily known to support Yanukovych, tried to
explain the apparent disagreement between Putin and Medvedev by
reference to their preferences in the upcoming election. According to
one diplomatic source, Medvedev prefers Yanukovych, while Putin is
inclined to support Tymoshenko (Segodnya, September 8).

Meanwhile, the Russian daily Vedomosti quoted sources in the Russian
government as saying that Putin plans to allot a loan in the range of
$1.5-2 billion to Ukraine in order to help Tymoshenko pay for Russian
gas deliveries. The newspaper also quoted a Fitch Ratings analyst
warning that the money could be used to support one of the candidates in
the upcoming election (Vedomosti, September 8).

--Pavel Korduban

 

 

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