[Ohio UZO News] Ukraine: Notes; WSJ; EDM (2)

[Deychak, Orest]

1.     Please let me know via return e-mail if you no longer wish to be
included on this list. This applies only to those of you who receive
this directly from me, and not via other lists.  Thanks.

2.       Helsinki Commission Congressional hearing on Ukraine, including
Chair, Co-chair and witness statements, testimony, video, click:  Link
<http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentR
ecord_id=469&Region_id=0&Issue_id=0&ContentType=H,B&ContentRecordType=H&
CFID=30948817&CFTOKEN=75142938> 


The Wall Street Journal Europe


Ukraine's Democracy in Danger 
By Alexander J. Motyl
30 March 2010
17


As Ukraine's recently elected President Viktor Yanukovych prepares to
visit Washington in April, he will aim to project an image of stability,
confidence, and control. In reality, Mr. Yanukovych has committed a
series of mistakes that could doom his presidency, scare off foreign
investors, and thwart the country's modernization.

Mr. Yanukovych's first mistake was to violate the constitution by
changing the rules according to which ruling parliamentary coalitions
are formed, making it possible for his party to take the lead in
partnership with several others, including the Communists. That move
immediately galvanized the demoralized opposition that clustered around
his challenger in the presidential elections, former Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko. 

His second mistake was to appoint as prime minister his crony Mykola
Azarov, a tough bureaucrat whose name is synonymous with government
corruption, ruinous taxation rates, and hostility to small business. The
appointment dispelled any hopes Ukrainians had that Mr. Yanukovych would
promote serious economic reform.

Viktor Yanukovych's misrule is courting a second 'Orange Revolution.'

His third mistake was to agree to a cabinet consisting of 29 ministers
as opposed to 25 before-an impossibly large number that will only
compound its inability to engage in serious decision making. That the
cabinet contained not one woman-Mr. Azarov claimed that reform was not
women's work-only reinforced the image of the cabinet as a dysfunctional
boys' club.

His fourth mistake was to appoint two nonentities-a former state farm
manager, and an economics graduate from a Soviet agricultural
institute-to head the ministries of economy and finance. Meanwhile, he
created a Committee on Economic Reform, consisting of 24 members, to
develop a strategy of economic change. The size of the committee
guarantees that it will be a talk shop, while the incompetence of the
two ministers means that whatever genuinely positive ideas the Committee
develops will remain on paper.

His fifth mistake was to appoint the controversial Dmytro Tabachnik as
minister of education. Mr. Tabachnik has expressed chauvinist views that
democratically inclined Ukrainians regard as deeply offensive to their
national dignity, such as the belief that west Ukrainians are not real
Ukrainians; endorsing the sanitized view of Soviet history propagated by
the Kremlin; and claiming that Ukrainian language and culture flourished
in Soviet times. Unsurprisingly, many Ukrainians have reacted in the
same way that African Americans would react to KKK head David Duke's
appointment to such a position-with countrywide student strikes,
petitions, and demonstrations directed as much at Mr. Yanukovych as at
Mr. Tabachnik. 

These five mistakes have effectively undermined Mr. Yanukovych's
legitimacy within a few weeks of his inauguration. The 45.5% of the
electorate that voted against him now feels vindicated; the 10-20% that
voted for him as the lesser of two evils now suspect that their fears of
Mrs. Tymoshenko's authoritarian tendencies were grossly exaggerated. And
everyone worries that Mr. Yanukovych and his band of Donbas-based "dons"
are ruthlessly pursuing the same anti-democratic agenda that sparked the
Orange Revolution of 2004. 

Several other key dismissals and appointments have only reinforced this
view. The director of the Security Service archives-a conscientious
scholar who permitted unrestricted public access to documentation
revealing Soviet crimes-has been fired. The National Television and
Radio Company has been placed in the hands of a lightweight entertainer
expected to toe the line. Most disturbing perhaps, several of Mr.
Yanukovych's anti-democratically inclined party allies have been placed
in charge of provincial ministries of internal affairs-positions that
give them broad scope to clamp down on the liberties of ordinary
citizens. 

Democratically inclined Ukrainians are increasingly persuaded that Mr.
Yanukovych wants to become Ukraine's version of Belarus's dictator,
Alexander Lukashenko. But Mr. Yanukovych's vision of strong-man rule
rests on a strategic, and possibly fatal, misunderstanding of Ukraine. 

First, the Orange Revolution and five years of Viktor Yushchenko's
presidency empowered the Ukrainian population, endowing it with a
self-confidence that it lacked before 2004 and consolidating a vigorous
civil society consisting of professionals, intellectuals, students, and
businesspeople with no fear of the powers that be. Mr. Yanukovych's
efforts to establish strong-man rule already are, and will continue to
be, resisted and ridiculed by the general population. 

Second, Ukraine's shambolic government apparatus cannot serve as the
basis of an effective authoritarian government. Tough talk alone will
fail to whip a bloated bureaucracy into shape. Worse, Ukraine's security
service and army are a far cry from those in Belarus. Mr. Yanukovych may
try to emulate Mr. Lukashenko, but without a strong bureaucracy and
coercive apparatus, he will fail.

Third, with an ineffective cabinet, all decision making will be
concentrated in Mr. Yanukovych's hands. Even if one ignores his
deficient education and poor grasp of facts, Mr. Yanukovych's
appointment of Mr. Tabachnik demonstrates that Ukraine's president is
either completely out of touch with his own country, or arrogantly
indifferent to public opinion. 

Fourth, Ukraine is still in the throes of a deep economic crisis. If Mr.
Yanukovych does nothing to fix the economy, Ukraine may soon face
default, and mass discontent among his working class constituency in the
southeast is likely. If Mr. Yanukovych does embark on serious reforms,
that same constituency will suffer and strikes are certain. So
negotiating the crisis will require popular legitimacy-which Mr.
Yanukovych is rapidly squandering; a strong government-which he does not
have; and excellent judgment-which is also missing from the equation. 

Indeed, if Mr. Yanukovych keeps on making anti-democratic mistakes, he
could very well provoke a second Orange Revolution. But this time the
demonstrators would consist of democrats, students, and workers. The
prospect of growing instability will do little to attract foreign
investors, while declining legitimacy, growing incompetence, and tub
thumping will fail to modernize Ukraine's industry, agriculture, and
education. Mr. Yanukovych could very well be an even greater failure as
president than Mr. Yushchenko. 

Although the outlook is grim, it is not yet hopeless for Ukraine's new
president. He could still grasp a modest victory from the jaws of an
embarrassing defeat by ruling as the president, not of Donetsk, but of
all Ukraine. All he has to do is restrain his appetite for power and
learn to rule with the opposition and with the population. It's not so
complicated-it's democracy.

Mr. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers
University-Newark. 

 Eurasia Daily Monitor 

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/> 

March 31, 2010

Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov Returns Empty-Handed from Moscow

Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, failed to persuade Moscow to
lower the price of gas for Ukraine. Although Kyiv's offer of
participation in a consortium to manage Ukraine's gas pipelines was not
openly rejected, it was hinted that this might not be enough. More
economic and political concessions are expected in exchange for cheap
gas. Azarov returned to Kyiv only with a promise that the talks will
continue. This was a test for the new Ukrainian government, which many
have dubbed as pro-Russian. If President, Viktor Yanukovych, and his
team do not agree to Russian conditions, Kyiv will have to turn for
financial assistance to the West, which will insist on serious reform.

Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, during his talks with Azarov on
March 25 flatly rejected Yanukovych's complaint that the January 2009
gas contracts were unfair as the price is too high compared to European
prices. Putin said that the contracts, which were concluded by Azarov's
predecessor Yulia Tymoshenko, must be honored. Azarov grudgingly
confirmed that Ukraine would continue to pay according to the contracts.
The only concession that Putin made was the promise that Russia would
not punish Ukraine for buying less gas than agreed. In the first quarter
of 2010, Ukraine imported 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian gas,
rather than 8.4 bcm as it stipulated in the contracts (Interfax, March
25). Putin made the same concession to Tymoshenko in 2009.

Putin and Azarov agreed that the gas talks will continue during April in
Moscow. Gazprom said it could discuss a decrease in prices if Ukraine
agreed to buy more than 33.75 bcm of gas in 2010 as set out in the
contracts (Kommersant-Ukraine, March 26). Gazprom wants Ukraine to pump
more gas into its underground storage facilities. Cash-strapped Ukraine,
whose GDP fell by 15 percent in 2009, cannot afford such terms. Azarov
said that Ukraine would buy only as much gas as needed for domestic
consumption, since "we do not need redundant gas" (UNIAN, March 26).

Azarov had arrived in Moscow at Putin's invitation as talks between
Ukrainian Fuel and Energy Minister, Yury Boyko, and Gazprom CEO Aleksey
Miller on March 23-24 produced no result. Miller was shown on TV telling
Boyko that contracts should be respected (Channel 5, March 24).
Ukrainian officials were determined to persuade Moscow to lower the
price of gas. Ukraine pays $305 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas in the
first quarter of 2010, and the average price for the year is expected to
reach $334 (RBK-Ukraine, March 24), compared to $228 in 2009. Kyiv
cannot afford this, especially as it is reluctant to increase domestic
gas prices which would be a very unpopular measure. The state-controlled
oil and gas behemoth Naftohaz Ukrainy continues to sell gas to end
consumers with heavy discounts, while buying from Russia at market
prices. Consequently, Naftohaz's deficit equaled 2.5 percent of GDP in
2009, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Speaking ahead of Boyko's trip, First Deputy Prime Minister, Andry
Klyuyev, said that Ukraine could not afford current Russian prices. He
said that in exchange for lower prices, Russia would be offered
participation in a consortium to manage Ukraine's gas transit network.
He opined that Ukraine would lose Russian gas transit without a
consortium as Moscow is set to use its new Nord Stream and South Stream
pipelines to bypass Ukraine. Klyuyev said that the gas transport network
would remain state-owned, while given as a concession to the consortium
which should include not only Russia and Ukraine, but also the EU (ICTV,
March 21).

Putin made it clear that a consortium would not prove sufficient to
lower the price of gas. He used the example of Belarus, which pays less
than $200 for Russian gas. "Why does Belarus buy gas for a price one
third lower? This is because we are building a union state and a customs
union with Belarus," said Putin (Interfax, March 26). Former Ukrainian
President, Viktor Yushchenko said, commenting on the talks, that Russia
would offer a union state or a customs union in exchange for cheap gas
(Ukrainska Pravda, March 26). Yanukovych is not enthusiastic about a
customs union with Russia, as it would contradict Ukraine's membership
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, some members of his team
are ready to make concessions. Deputy Prime Minister, Volodymyr
Semynozhenko, suggested that a union state with Russia and Belarus
should not be rejected as an option along with EU membership (Ukraina
TV, March 26).

If Yanukovych and Azarov accept any kind of union as a condition for
cheap gas, Ukraine would be firmly back within Russia's orbit.
Otherwise, it will be difficult for Ukraine to survive without Western
assistance. The Ukrainian cabinet will eventually have to increase
domestic gas prices, but not double them as the World Bank suggested.
Such a move would badly damage the ruling party ahead of the local
elections, which are scheduled to be held within several months. In
March 2009 the EU pledged loans to rescue Naftohaz, on the condition
that it would be reformed. The offer resulted in no action, as it vexed
Putin.

--Pavel Korduban

Eurasia Daily Monitor

 

March 26, 2010

 

Pro-Russian Old Guard, Returns to Run Ukrainian Security Forces 


President Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov are both
ignoring the sensitivities of "Orange" Western and Central Ukraine by
returning to positions of power individuals from Leonid Kuchma's second
term in office. Moreover, defectors from the Kuchma regime, who had
received asylum in Russia out of fear that Viktor Yushchenko would
implement the Orange Revolution slogan of "Bandits to Prison!" are in
the process of returning to Ukraine (EDM, April 14, May 25, 2005). 


On March 21, Ukrayinska Pravda reported the return of two individuals
(Borys Kolesnikov and Viktor Tikhonov) involved in organizing the
November 2004 separatist meeting in Severodonetsk (EDM, November 28,
2004). Criminal charges against separatists that were filed in 2005, as
in other prominent cases involving Ukraine's elites, were never
completed (EDM, June 23, 2005). 


Many of those returning to the security forces were wanted by Interpol,
but had received asylum in Russia, ready to return if and when their
patron, Yanukovych came to power. They have returned to the Interior
Ministry (MVS) and head oblast branches in "Orange' Western and Central
Ukraine (Ukrayinska Pravda, March 21). First Deputy Sergei Popov headed
MVS internal forces despatched to crush the Orange Revolution on
November 28, 2004, but were turned back by the intervention of the
Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and the military. 


Vasyl Vartsaba served as a militia officer and was removed in December
2004. Seven months later he was placed on an Interpol international
watch list. He helped to organize the first incident of violence that
shook the 2004 elections in the Mukachevo mayoral election in April of
that year (EDM, May 5, 2004). Vartsaba is to head the Galician region of
Ivano-Frankivsk's MVS, while his deputy in 2004, Viktor Rusyn, will head
the Trans-Carpathian MVS. Rusyn spent six months in jail in 2005, for
his part in election fraud and violence in the previous year (Ukrayinska
Pravda, March 21). 


Defectors currently living in Russia, ready to return to Ukraine,
include the former Odessa Party of Regions leader, Ruslan Bodelan, and
General Mykola Bilokin, who headed the MVS in 2004 (EDM, July 20, 2004).
The most notorious returnee will be the former Deputy Chairman of the
SBU Volodymyr Satsiuk (in 2004), who owned the dacha where Yushchenko
was allegedly poisoned. Another individual set to return is Ihor Bakay,
who fled to Russia in December 2004 after misappropriating over $1
million as head of the DUS (department that serves senior officials). 


Korrespondent magazine (March 18) analyzed the Azarov cabinet and found
it was not only dominated by "Donetski" and Party of Regions members,
but also by wealthy businessmen such as Deputy Prime Ministers
Kolesnikov, Sergei Tigipko and SBU Chairman Valeriy Khoroshkovsky (EDM,
March 18). 


Another factor that Korrespondent exposed was that 12 out of 29 members
of the Azarov government had been implicated in criminal cases or were
witnesses to them. Nearly half the cabinet are former high ranking
members of the Soviet Ukrainian nomenklatura or KGB. Among the 29
cabinet members, 13 were former KGB officers or had collaborated with
the Soviet security departments The best known example is Deputy Prime
Minister Volodymyr Sivkovych, who has responsibility for overseeing the
security forces. 


Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, the Ukrainian Ambassador to
Russia under Yushchenko, had high ranking ties to the communist
nomenklatura. Hryshchenko's career was developed in Moscow during the
Soviet era. Although Hrushchenko has a reputation as a professional
diplomat, the political expert Oleh Medvedev pointed out that
Hryshchenko had admitted that the Russian leadership lobbied for him to
receive the post (Ukrayinska Pravda, March 22). On March 21, Hryshchenko
said on Inter channel that "Ukraine will never allow any organization
she remains within to be used against Russia." 


After the Orange Revolution, Hrushchenko joined the Republican Party
(RPU) established by the "Godfather" of the opaque gas intermediary
RosUkrEnergo and now Minister of Fuels and Energy, Yuriy Boyko
(Ukrayinska Pravda, March 13). Hryshchenko was number 18 on the "Ne
Tak!" (Not Like That!) election bloc organized by the Social Democratic
United Party (SDPUo) for the March 2006 elections. 


Ne Tak! stood on a virulently anti-NATO platform and failed to enter
parliament after receiving only one percent of the vote, thus ending the
SDPUo's hopes of re-entering post-Kuchma politics. Boyko, who was on the
verge of arrest in summer 2005 for abuse of office when he was head of
Naftohaz Ukrainy in 2002-2004, switched to the stronger Party of Regions
with which the RPU merged in 2007. Boyko stood in the Party of Regions
list in the 2007 elections. 


Yanukovych and Azarov have claimed they would prioritize the struggle
against corruption but this, as in the Kuchma and Yushchenko era's, is
very likely to become a "virtual" struggle. A real campaign against
corruption requires political will demonstrated by the Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili, but which Yanukovych lacks. The German
think tank, Transparency International, assigned Ukraine and Russia both
146th rankings last year and Georgia 66th in their annual corruption
index. In the past two decades, Ukraine has adopted and passed on
corruption, seven laws, two criminal codes, 16 presidential decrees, ten
government resolutions, two instructions, two supreme court resolutions,
and two orders from the finance ministry and civil service (Natsionalna
Bezpeka i Oborona, no.97, 2009, http://www.uceps.org/ukr/journal.php.
Despite one of the largest and most rapid transfers from state to
private control of any economy, the SBU and prosecutor-general's office
has never convicted a single member of the Ukrainian elites for abuse of
office or corruption. 


Half of Ukraine's 14 wealthiest oligarchs are parliamentary deputies and
most of these were elected as members of the Party of Regions. An
opinion poll quoted in Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona (number 7, 2009)
asked which parliamentary political forces are most prone to corruption
and which most seek to combat it. The Party of Regions was considered to
be most prone to corruption (14.3 percent) and only 5.1 percent believe
that they actively combat the phenomenon. The Yulia Tymoshenko bloc
scored 13 percent and 14.9 percent respectively, the only political
force where more Ukrainians believed that they fought corruption. 


Yanukovych and Azarov have not implemented cadre policies that would
unite Ukraine, as the former promised in the election campaign, and the
government cannot in any shape or form be considered reformist. 



--Taras Kuzio   

 

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/ms-tnef
Size: 22003 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://clevelanduzo.org/pipermail/uzonews_clevelanduzo.org/attachments/20100331/1a3691e7/attachment.bin>